Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy by Donoho, Douglas Lee
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 29
Issue 2 1996 Article 1
Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations
Response to the Disruption of Democracy
Douglas Lee Donoho
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donoho, Douglas Lee (1996) "Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 29: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol29/iss2/1
Evolution or Expediency:




In recent years, democratic governance has gained significant political sali-
ence in international law and relations. Western academics have used
democracy as a talismanic test of state legitimacy1 while dozens of coun-
tries have enjoyed transitions toward more democratic forms of govern-
ment.2 Similarly, the United Nations has become increasingly involved in
promoting democracy, primarily by providing various forms of electoral
assistance to member states.3 Consequently, U.N.-sponsored competitive
elections now appear to be the compromise of choice for states torn by civil
war or regional conflict. 4
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Ft.
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Camden; LL.M., Harvard University Law School.
1. See TomJ. Farer, Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States:
The Western Hemisphere's Prospect, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 716, 723, 727, 735 (1993). E.g.,
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INr'L L. 46,
76-77 (1992); IbrahimJ. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance
and Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 255, 307 (1994);
Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy,
34 HAv. IT'L J. 163 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 866, 869-70 (1990).
2. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/47/1 (1992); Farer, supra note 1, at 725;
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YAEJ. INT'L
L. 539, 540 (1992); Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion Under Clinton, 18 WASH.
Q. 13 (1995); Secretary General: The 38th Floor, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 3. But see
Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives On The Emerging Norm Of Democracy In Inter-
national Law, 86 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 261, 262-66 (1992) (characterizing the "tide of
democracy" as "facile universalism" and "probably an incorrect way of viewing the trend
toward democracy," id. at 262); Stanley Meisler, Democracy Takes Hold-Sort of, L.A.
TiMEs, Nov. 1, 1991, at Al.
3. See infra notes 23-55 and accompanying text.
4. Recent examples include El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Western Sahara,
Cambodia, Eritrea, and Liberia. See, e.g., Angola: A 'Major, Tragic Setback': UNAVEM II
Mandate Extended, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 27; Central America: 900-Person Electoral
Division to Monitor March 1994 Elections, id. at 23 (El Salvador); Eritrea: UN 'Peace-
Building' Gives Birth to New Nation, id. at 39; Liberia: Renewed Fighting Delays Election
Process, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 15; Mozambique: U.N. Operation in Full Swing; Force
of 6,000 Deployed, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 25; Western Sahara: Differences Narrow
on Voting Criteria, id. at 29.
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On September 30, 1991, only nine months after the U.N. helped
organize and monitor the first free and fair democratic election in Haiti's
history,5 a bloody military coup posed a dramatic challenge to the U.N.'s
new-found commitment to democracy.6 For nearly two years the U.N.'s
response to this challenge followed a familiar pattern: the General Assem-
bly passed powerless, non-binding resolutions endorsing the efforts of the
Organization of American States (OAS) to return President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to power while the Security Council remained inactive and nearly
silent. 7 OnJune 16, 1993, however, the United Nations arguably entered a
brave new world in support of democracy. Citing Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter,8 the Security Council issued a potentially revolutionary order cre-
ating mandatory economic sanctions aimed at restoring Aristide to power.9
Following another year of continued intransigence by the military,10 the
Council authorized member states to utilize "all necessary means" to
restore democracy in Haiti. 1 For the first time in U.N. history, the Council
had authorized force to restore democracy in an independent sovereign
nation. 12 This authorization ultimately proved effective and, pursuant to
an eleventh-hour agreement brokered by former President Carter,1 3 Aris-
tide was welcomed back to Haiti on October 15, 1994, by over 17,000 U.S.
troops.
14
5. See Haiti Holds Free, Democratic Elections with UN Help, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1991,
at 62. See generally Barbara L. Bernier, Economic Development in Ravaged Haiti: Is
Democracy Really The Answer?, 11 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 49 (1992).
6. See infra notes 23-55 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
8. U.N. CHamE arts. 52-54. Chapter VII of the Charter provides the only source of
mandatory orders within the U.N. system. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying
text.
9. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 119-21, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1993). See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
10. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Again Imposes Sanctions on Haiti After Pact Fails, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1993, at Al; infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
11. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. & Dec. at 51-52, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50
(1994). See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 23-30, 178-87, 226 and accompanying text; UNITED NATIONS,
SECURITY CouNcIL; PRovisioNAL VERBATim RECORD OF THE THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUN-
DRED AND TrmTEEarn MEETING, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413 (1994).
13. See Ann Devroy, Carter Swayed Clinton Into Bending in Talks: Ex-President
Viewed Cedras More Benignly, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 20, 1994, at Al; William Drozdiak, Allies
Hail Haiti Pact, Pledge Aid, WASH. Posr, Sept. 20, 1994, at A14; President Carter, Colin
Powell and Senator Sam Nunn reportedly reached an agreement with Haitian military
leaders only minutes before a U.S. invasion was to begin. Id.
14. Pursuant to the Carter agreement, more than 2,000 U.S. marines were peacefully
deployed on September 19, 1994. Douglas Farah, U.S. Troops Find Haiti Calm, Military
Cooperative, WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1994, at Al; Multinational Force Dispatched to Pave
Way for Aristide's Return, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 20; Larry Rohter, 3000 U.S. Troops
Land Without Opposition and Take Over Ports and Airfields in Haiti, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20,
1994, at Al. By the end of September, this so-called "multi-national force" (MNF)
authorized by Resolution 841 consisted of over 17,000 personnel. Perry: Haiti Showing
'Significant Progress,' MIAMI HERAI, Oct. 9, 1994, at 23A. During April of 1995, the
MNF was replaced by a 6,900 member U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). See Larry
Rohter, U.N. Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 2, 1995, at 14.
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Utilizing the crisis in Haiti as a case study, this Article analyzes the
depth of the U.N.'s current commitment to democracy by focusing on its
potential role as an active force in preserving or restoring democracy in
member states through mandatory collective action. It also attempts to
place this potential role in the larger context of a new world order in which
a relatively united and reinvigorated Security Council has begun to play an
increasingly activist role in humanitarian crises and internal conflicts3.5
As set forth below, the disruption of democracy in Haiti presented the
new world order with an old dilemma: reconciling the demands of rapidly
evolving principles of substantive international law, such as self-determina-
tion, democratic governance and the promotion of human rights, with
states' almost instinctual and atavistic impulses to preserve their sovereign
prerogatives. On the surface, the U.N.'s response to the coup in Haiti
appears to have been a strong endorsement of democracy and a potentially
powerful means for its protection. On closer examination, however, the
Council's actions created a legally and politically ambiguous precedent for
future U.N. efforts to preserve or restore democratic governance.
On one hand, the Security Council's imposition of economic sanc-
tions and authorization of force against the coup ostensibly reflects the
recognition that, at least under certain conditions, disruption of democ-
racy may constitute a threat to international peace justifying collective
enforcement action.16 On the other hand, the circumstances surrounding
Haiti, particularly the role of U.S. political interests and practical consider-
ations, may ultimately render the U.N.'s actions in Haiti sui generis. 7 The
15. Since 1989, for example, the Security Council has utilized its authority to protect
Iraqi Kurds from their own government, to create civilian safe havens in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, to deliver humanitarian assistance in Somalia and to prosecute alleged genocide in
Rwanda. See infra notes 117, 131, 166, 169-71, 178, 237. This increasingly activist
agenda has generated numerous recent commentaries regarding the Security Council's
self-authorized expansion of authority. See, e.g., WALTR HofFmANN, UNrTE NATIONS
SEcuam CouNcIL REFORM AND RESTRuCTURING (1994); PETER MALANCZU,, HumANrrARAN
INTERVE nON AND THE LEGrnmACY OF THE UsE OF FORCE (1993); Nancy D. Arnison, Inter-
national Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sover-
eignty?, 17 FLErCHER F. WoR.D AFF. 199 (1993); Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The Legality
of U.N. Forcible Humanitarian Intervention, 17 SuFFouc T SANSNAT'L J. 138 (1994);
David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 552 (1993); Judy A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council
Resolution 688: A Reappraisal in Light of a Changing World Order, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
PoI'Y 881 (1992); Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq,
Somalia and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994); W. Michael Reisman, The Constitu-
tional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 85-86 (1993); Lawrence D.
Roberts, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and Its Aftermath: The Need for
Legitimacy, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & Po. 593 (1993). See generally ENFORCING RES:RANT:
COLLECrIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CoNFLcrs (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinaf-
ter ENFORCING REsTR AiN]; LAw AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori F.
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) [hereinafter Law AND FORCE].
16. See infra notes 182-213 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 215-79 and accompanying text. The Council itself took pains to
characterize the situation in Haiti as "unique and exceptional," requiring "extraordinary
measures" and "an exceptional response." S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9; S.C. Res. 940,
supra note 11. Similarly, the Council President also asserted after the vote on Resolution
841 that "[m]embers of the Council have asked me to say that the adoption of this
Cornell International Law Journal
U.N.'s failure to act in similar on-going situations reinforces this outlook.
Moreover, many states have strongly resisted the idea of a Security
Council self-empowered to intervene in support of democracy, human
rights or internal civil order.18 This resistance appears to demonstrate
continuing ambivalence among many states to any significant retrench-
ment from traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and non-interfer-
ence in the "essentially... domestic" affairs of states. 19 Such ambivalence
reflects both the self-interested motivations of tyrants and the non-Western
world's legitimate misgivings about the institutional decision-making struc-
ture of the U.N. 20 Absent unlikely institutional reforms designed to safe-
guard the interests of such states, the potential for strong Security Council
action to preserve and protect democracy will probably remain weak in
spite of the Haitian example, at least when the situation does not implicate
the political interests of the United States.2 1
Part I of this Article briefly describes the U.N.'s efforts to promote
democracy prior to the Council's actions in Haiti and outlines the basic
allocation of institutional authority justifying such activity. Part II
describes the U.N.'s response to the 1991 coup's disruption of the U.N.
sponsored democratic transition in Haiti. Part III sets forth the legal back-
ground shaping the U.N.'s response to the crisis in Haiti and defines the
parameters of debate over the propriety of that action, and any future U.N.
action, to preserve or restore a democratic government. Part IV evaluates
the justifications for Security Council action to restore democratic rule in
Haiti. Part V considers a series of factors likely to inhibit future decisive,
meaningful U.N. action in this area. In conclusion, this analysis indicates
that the prospects for future aggressive U.N. action to preserve or restore
democracy rest on making significant institutional reforms to the U.N.
decision-making processes. 22
resolution is warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not
be regarded as constituting a precedent." UNrnE NATIONS, SEcurrY COUNCIL; PROVI.
sioNAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE THOUSAND Two HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH
MEENG, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238 (1993). This statement apparently was promoted
by Pakistan, Brazil and China. See id. at 15, 17, 20.
18. See infra notes 237-49, 255-66 and accompanying text.
19. U.N. CHARnm art. 2(7). See infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 248-66 and accompanying text; The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON.,
Mar. 1993, at 37-49; The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1992, at 20-33, 36; DavidJ.
Scheffer, Drawing the Line Short of Genocide, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1992, at A15.
Although often phrased in terms of the traditional West versus East political conflict, the
non-Western world's misgivings about the "new world order" have also surfaced in the
context of continuing North (developed countries) versus South (less developed coun-
tries) economic tensions. See, e.g., The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1993, at 37,
40, 45-46; The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1992, at 25-26, 28; Social Issues: Deac-
tivating the "Time Bomb," id. at 85. In either case, Western developed nations (and
Japan) are typically seen as sharing interests fundamentally different from those of less
developed countries, the Islamic world, and socialist states. See, e.g., Erskine B.
Childers, Gulf Crisis Lessons for the United Nations, 23 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 129-38
(1992).
21. See infra notes 215-79 and accompanying text.
22. An important distinction may be drawn between preserving or restoring existing
democracy and promoting the emergence of democracy where none previously existed.
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I. United Nations Efforts to Promote Democracy Prior to the Coup in
Haiti
Prior to Security Council Resolutions 841 and 940, U.N. efforts to promote
democracy were essentially limited to assisting voluntary transitions to
democratic governance with the consent of a member state or the parties to
a conflict3. 3 These efforts to promote democratic governance through vol-
untary means arguably began at the organization's inception under Chap-
ters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter.2 4 Pursuant to these provisions, the
U.N. Trusteeship Council has organized over thirty plebiscites since 1945,
bringing self-rule and independence (although rarely a lasting democracy)
It is clearly possible to envision potential U.N. efforts to promote the emergence of demo-
cratic governance in non-democratic member states through Chapter VII sanctions.
Indeed, as pointed out below, there are few rational legal distinctions between the Char-
ter justifications for restoring existing democracy and promoting or creating democracy.
See infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text. Political and practical considerations,
however, render differences between the words "promote," "create," "restore," and "pre-
serve" much more than mere semantics. "Restoration" of democracy, for example, logi-
cally implies assistance to a dispossessed government previously recognized by the U.N.
as the legitimate representative of the state. In contrast, efforts to "create" democracy
would be aimed at changing an existing undemocratic government already representing
a member state at the U.N. "Promotion," however, would only imply encouragement
without coercive measures or meaningful consequences for the recalcitrant government.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text. Thus, "restoring," "preserving," "creating,"
and "promoting" each may imply different levels of intrusiveness and accompanying
risks and expense. Moreover, significant uncertainties linger over what constitutes gen-
uine democracy, self-determination and related international human rights. See Douglas
L. Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institu-
tional Critique, 14 MIcH. J. ItLrr'i L. 827, 840-43 (1993). Debate over these uncertainties
directly affects the degree of consensus available for various actions, which in turn
depends on the perceived intrusiveness of "promoting" versus "creating" versus "restor-
ing" a democratic government. Thus, for practical purposes, the distinctions between
actions to "promote," "create," "preserve" or "restore" democracy are important consider-
ations in evaluating the lessons of Haiti and the U.N.'s commitment to democracy.
23. Two ambiguous exceptions to this history arguably are Security Council resolu-
tions imposing sanctions on racist minority regimes in Southern Rhodesia, S.C. Res.
253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Year, Res. & Dec. at 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23 (1968), and South
Africa, S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Year, Res. & Dec. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33
(1977). See infra notes 187-88.
24. Chapter XI of the Charter sets forth the "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Gov-
erning Territories" which implicitly recognizes the goal of self-governance for colonial-
ized peoples. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(b). See generally La.AND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNTr NATiO Ns 406-75 (2d ed. 1949). Chapter XII creates the
U.N. Trusteeship system which was designed to facilitate self-government and the even-
tual independence of territories voluntarily placed under U.N. mandate by colonial pow-
ers. U.N. CHARTER arts. 76, 77. Chapter XIII created the Trusteeship Council, whose
mandate has been to assist the Security Council and General Assembly in administering
the trust territories. Id. arts. 83, 85, 87. With the recent independence of the Republic
of Palau (in "free association" with the United States), the work of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil appears now to be at an end. See Trusteeship Council: Palau Compact Implementation
Urged, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1994, at 55. Issues of decolonization, though greatly dimin-
ished, remain on the U.N.'s agenda. See G.A. Res. 49/89, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994); Decolonization: Special Committee Concludes
Session, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 37.
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to former colonies and other non-self-governing territories. 25 Since the late
1980s, however, the U.N. has become increasingly involved in the active
promotion of democratic governance among its membership. 26 The most
important and visible forms of this activity have been the Security Coun-
cil's sponsorship of elections relating to international peace-keeping2 7 and
the General Assembly's authorization of civilian election assistance
requested by a member state.28
25. See UNrE NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRErARY-GENERAL, U.N.
Doc. A/46/609 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS].
26. Support by the United Nations System for the Efforts of Governments to Promote
and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, G.A. Res. 49/30, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994); UNrE NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY;
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS:
REPORT OF THE SECRErARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/675 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
REPORT ON ELECTIONS]; UNITED NATIONS, GENER. ASSEMBLY; ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRrARY
GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/48/590 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 REPORT ON ELECTIONS]; see 1991
REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25. See generallyJon M. Ebersole, The United Nations'
Response to Requests for Assistance in Electoral Matters, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1992); Fox,
supra note 2; Melida N. Hodgson, When To Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework For
U.N. Election Monitoring, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 137 (1992); W. Michael Reisman,
International Election Observation, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1992); David Stoelting, The
Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371
(1992).
27. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 39-44. There are a number of other important ways in which the
U.N. currently promotes democracy. See generally 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra
note 26, at 8-11, 27-31; 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25, at 5-7. Since 1976,
for example, the U.N. Development Program has rendered "technical" electoral assist-
ance to a variety of countries pursuant to its mandate to promote human development.
Id. at 13-14. See Ebersole, supra note 26, at 106-09. U.N. human rights organizations,
most notably the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, have also provided some
advisory and educational services relating to democratic rights. UNITED NATIONS, GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY, ENHANCING THE EFFECVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE
ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 14-15, Doc. A/47/668 (1992) [herein-
after 1992 REPORT ON ELECnONS]. See Ebersole, supra note 26, at 110-115. Finally, in
1992, the Secretary-General created an Electoral Assistance Unit pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 46/137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49 (1991), and appointed an Under Secretary-General as the "focal point" for elec-
tion assistance requests. Since October 1992, this Unit has received about 30 requests
per year from member states for some form of electoral assistance (usually technical).
See 1992 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra, at 3-4, 8-9, annex 1; 1993 REPORT ON ELECTIONS,
supra note 26, at 23-35; 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 26, at 14-24. In 1994, the
Unit was renamed the Electoral Assistance Division and transferred to the Department of
Peace-keeping Operations. Id. at 4. It has helped to coordinate U.N. electoral activity,
develop standards and collect and disseminate information. The unit has also devel-
oped distinctions between various levels of U.N. electoral involvement including techni-
cal or advisory services, support for other international observers, "following" an
election process, "verification" of results, "supervision" of an election and, at maximum
involvement, "organization and conduct" of an election. Id. at 28-30; 1992 REPORT ON
ELECTIONS, supra, at 2-8. Such distinctions may determine whether electoral assistance
will be given, who may authorize it and under what conditions. 1994 REPORT ON ELEC-
TIONS, supra note 26, at 27-28. See G.A. Res. 46/137, supra, at 209; 1992 Report on
Elections, supra, at 63; 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25, at 3-4, 24-26. Verifica-
tion, supervision and organizational missions each require the prior approval of U.N.
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The Security Council's and General Assembly's activities in this regard
find different justifications under the Charter. The Charter justification for
Security Council actions promoting democracy derives from the Council's
mandate to preserve international peace and security.29 Until Haiti, how-
ever, such actions were strictly limited to missions authorized with the sub-
ject state's consent, rather than imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter.30 Pursuant to this authority, the Security Council has authorized
extensive involvement of U.N. peace-keepers to assist in democratic transi-
tions in Namibia,3 1 Cambodia,32 Angola,33 Mozambique34 and El Salva-
political organs in addition to the state's formal request for assistance. 1994 REPORT ON
ELECrIONs, supra note 26, at 28. See 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25, at 4.
29. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. For example, the apparent
absence of a "threat to peace" caused the Council to decline Haiti's request for security
assistance in conducting national elections in 1990 and instead to defer the issue to the
General Assembly. See Stoelting, supra note 26, at 381-83; Haiti Says U.N. Election Aid
Criticalfor Future Government, REuTRs, July 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters File. See also UNrmo NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEmBLT, PROvISIONAL VERBArlm REcoRD
OF THE TwcrrY NiNTH MEETNG, at 59-60, 66-68, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.29 (1990).
30. See infra notes 114-18, 129-32, 136 and accompanying text. Even in the context
of Cambodia, which involved a clear breach of international peace (in the form of Viet-
nam's invasion and occupation of that country and an active cross-border civil war), the
Security Council was unwilling to impose U.N. operations under Chapter VII, insisting
instead on first securing the consent of all warring factions. See Steven R. Ratner, The
Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1993).
31. E.g., S.C. Res. 632, U.N. SCOR, 44th Year, Res. & Dec. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/45
(1989). In 1978 the Security Council approved a plan for resolving the armed conflict
between South Africa and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) over
Namibia, which included the organization of elections. S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d
Year, Res. & Dec. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978). See S.C. Res. 431, U.N. SCOR, 33d
Year, Res. & Dec. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978); S.C. Res. 385, U.N. SCOR, 31st
Year, Res. & Dec. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976). Although technically part of the
decolonization process, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia is
the first example of comprehensive U.N. involvement-including military peace-keepers,
police personnel, civilian election monitors and administrators-in the transition from
regional conflict to peace and democratic governance. See Namibia, The Making of a New
Nation, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1989, at 35-48; Namibian Elections Declared 'Free and Fair,'
U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1990, at 41-45.
32. The U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established by the
Security Council in 1992 to organize and conduct elections in Cambodia in accordance
with a comprehensive peace settlement signed in October 1991 in Paris. S.C. Res. 745,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 39-41, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992). See Cambodia:
Peace Process in Danger of Paralysis, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1993, at 25; Security Council
Approves 'Largest, Most Complex' Peace-Keeping Operation in U.N. History, U.N. CHRON.,
June 1992, at 10-14; UN: 'Major, Unprecedented' Role, Peace Treaty to End Cambodian
Conflict Signed in Paris: Cease-Fire Agreement in Effect, U.N. CHRoN., Mar. 1992, at 53.
UNTAC's operations, which involved over 20,000 personnel, included human rights
monitoring, electoral assistance, military operations (to verify the withdrawal, disarming
and demobilization of armed combatants), police supervision, repatriation of refugees,
reorganization of civil administration and rehabilitation of people and infrastructures.
See Security Council Approves 'Largest, Most Complex' Peace-Keeping Operation in U.N.
History, supra, at 10; U.N. Peace-Keeping: U.N. Operations: Not Only Expanding, But
Breaking New Ground, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 42-45. See generally Ratner, supra
note 30. Elections were successfully held in May 1993, and later endorsed by the Secur-
ity Council. U.N. Peace-Keeping: The 'Second Generation,' Cambodian Elections 'Free &
Fair,' but Challenges Remain, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 32-38.
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dor35 as a result of internationally brokered peace plans. It has similarly
authorized election monitoring in the Western Sahara, Liberia and South
Africa.36 Such "transitional operations" can become quite extensive.37 For
33. S.C. Res 747, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 85-89, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992); S.C. Res. 626, U.N. SCOR, 43d Year, Res. & Dec. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/44
(1988). The U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) helped organize elections in
Angola in October 1992 pursuant to a peace plan worked out between the United States,
Cuba, the U.S.S.R., armed rebels (UNITA), the U.N., and the Angolan government. See
S.C. Res. 976, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at-, U.N. Doc. S/INF/. (1995) (to
be published in the Security Council Official Record) (creating UNAVEM III); S.C. Res.
747, supra (extending UNAVEM's original mandate of verifying compliance with peace
accords to include the supervision of elections); Angola: UN Special Representative
Declares Angolan Elections 'Generally Free and Fair,' U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 9-11.
This process has met with mixed success. See Angola: A 'Major, Tragic Setback':
UNAVEM If Mandate Extended, supra note 4, at 27; Angola: Lusaka Protocol Welcomed
Ending 20 Years of War: UNAVEM II Extended Until February 1995, U.N. CHRON., Mar.
1995, at 16.
34. In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the U.N. Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to monitor a cease-fire and to conduct elections. S.C. Res.
797, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 108-10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992). In
accordance with the Secretary-General's plan, ONUMOZ's operations included political,
military, electoral and humanitarian components. See Mozambique: U.N. Operation in
Full Swing; Force of 6,000 Deployed, supra note 4, at 25-26. Elections held in October
1994 were declared "free and fair" by U.N. representatives. Mozambique: Council
Endorses October Elections, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 13.
35. S.C. Res. 729, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992); S.C. Res. 693, U.N. SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 33-34, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47
(1991). See Central America: 900-Person Electoral Division to Monitor March 1994 Elec-
tions, supra note 4, at 23. The U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) includes
military, police, election and human rights components, designed to supervise compli-
ance with aJanuary 1992 peace accord. See Peace Treaty on El Salvador Conflict Signed in
Mexico City, U.N. CHRON., June 1992, at 29. See generally UNrrED NATIONS, SEcuRrrY
COUNCIL; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNrrTED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN
EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1212 (1994). This is the first time that the United
Nations has given U.N. personnel a direct, clear mandate to investigate, comment and
make recommendations regarding human rights abuses within a country as part of a
comprehensive peace plan. See Central America: El Salvador: UN Observer Mission
Monitors Human Rights, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 34-35. The General Assembly
authorized a similar function for the U.N. Mission for the Verification of Human Rights
and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala,
in September 1994. G.A. Res. 48/267, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 15,
U.N. Doc. A/48/49/Add.1 (1994).
36. In 1990, the Security Council authorized U.N. organization and supervision of a
referendum in the disputed territory of Western Sahara which will allow the populace to
choose between independence and integration with Morocco. S.C. Res. 809, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 90-91, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); S.C. Res. 690, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 35-36, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991); S.C. Res. 658, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Year, Res. & Dec. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). The role of the U.N.
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), already in flux, has bogged
down over thorny issues regarding voter eligibility. See Western Sahara: Hope for 'Transi-
tion Period' by June, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 23. See also G.A. Res. 45/21, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990); Western Sahara:
Preparations for Referendum Asked, U.N. CHRON.,June 1993, at 34. In 1993, the Security
Council approved the deployment of election observers for Liberia (UNOMIL) in cooper-
ation with the Economic Community of West African states. S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR,
48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 101-02, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993). See Liberia: Peace Agree-
ment Concluded, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 26-27. The Council also authorized the
U.N.'s successful involvement in South Africa's first non-racial elections which resulted
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example, transitional operations in Cambodia involved over 20,000 U.N.
personnel in 1992-93. These personnel not only organized and conducted
successful elections, but also assisted in reformulating Cambodia's war-
torn governmental infrastructure in an effort to complete a peaceful transi-
tion to democratic rule.38
The General Assembly has also recently taken unprecedented steps to
promote democracy. The most important and controversial of these efforts
have been the Assembly's authorization of election verification and moni-
toring assistance to member states, 39 beginning with Nicaragua in 198940
and Haiti in 1990.41 The General Assembly also recently authorized the
successful U.N. verification of the referendum on Eritrea's independence
from Ethiopia.42
There are two potential Charter-based rationales for the Assembly's
authority to conduct such activities in support of democracy. The first
rests on the Assembly's residual role in preserving international peace and
security. 43 The second rests on the Assembly's broad mandate to promote
in Nelson Mandela's election as President in April 1994. See South Africa: South Africa
Rejoins the World Community, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1994, at 4-8.
37. See Boutros Boutros Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 113
(1992); supra notes 31-36.
38. See supra note 32.
39. The early history of electoral assistance by the General Assembly is well
described in the literature. See, e.g., Ebersole, supra note 26; Fox, supra note 2; Stoelting,
supra note 26.
40. G.A. Res. 44/10, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989). The General Assembly's action regarding Nicaraguan elections was not so much
an authorization as it was an after the fact ratification of the Secretary-Generals decision
to send observers. 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25, at 10-12. See UNiED
NATIONS, GENERAL AsSEMBLY, LETrER DATED 6 JULY 1989 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.N. Doc. A/44/375 (1989). The
U.N.'s involvement, which was in part justified as supporting the regional peace-keeping
process initiated by the Esquipulas II agreements between Costa Rica, Honduras, Nica-
ragua and El Salvador, was also subsequently endorsed by the Security Council. Id. at
11-13; S.C. Res. 637, U.N. SCOR, 44th Year, Res. & Dec. at 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/45
(1989).
41. G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/45/49
(1990). See generally 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25; Haiti Holds Free, Demo-
cratic Elections with U.N. Help, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1991, at 62-64.
42. G.A. Res. 47/114, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 195, U.N. Doc. A/47/
49 (1992). See Eritrea: U.N. 'Peace-Building' Gives Birth to New Nation, supra note 4, at
39; 4th General Assembly: Increased Responsibilities, A Wider, More Practical Role, U.N.
CHRON., Mar. 1993, at 29.
43. The Charter allocates primary responsibility for peace and security, and the
U.N.'s only mandatory powers, to the Security Council. See infra notes 108-18 and
accompanying text. When, however, the Security Council either has not acted or has
requested General Assembly assistance, the Assembly may take actions to preserve the
peace including recommendations to the membership. U.N. CHuRER arts. 10-12, 14.
See GOODRICH & -AMBRO, supra note 24, at 24-28, 150-82; infra notes 111-12. See, e.g.,
G.A. Res. 34/93F, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980) (urging oil embargo of South Africa). See also G.A. Res 377A(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th
Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); IA BROWrNLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 333-34 (1991). Although technically prohibited by
Article 12, the Assembly, in practice, frequently voices its opinion regarding matters
related to international peace and security even when the Security Council is "seized" of
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peace, human development and human rights-all of which seem to justify
its activities in support of democracy in member states.44 In the case of
Nicaragua, the General Assembly's involvement was at least partially justi-
fied as the end product of a comprehensive international plan to bring
peace to the region. 45 In contrast, Haiti was not involved in any regional
conflict and the existence of an "international dimension"46 to its election
monitoring request was questionable. 47 Although manifestly benign, these
Assembly activities have nevertheless been controversial because they have
occurred in independent member states not involved in either decoloniza-
tion or ongoing armed conflict.48
Because the General Assembly has no power to order U.N. supervision
of an election, the provision of electoral assistance depends upon the invi-
the matter. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/10, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (requesting that the Security Council exempt Bosnia from arms
embargo); G.A. Res. 49/87B, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/
49/49 (1994) (regarding Israeli occupation of Golan Heights); G.A. Res. 49/140, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (regarding civil war in
Afghanistan). U.N. Charter Articles 10, 11, 14, 17 and 22 also may allow for the authori-
zation of peace-keeping forces by the General Assembly. See JOHN MACKINLAY & JARAT
CHOPRA, A DRAFr CONCEPT OF SECOND GENERATION MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1993, at
26-29 (1993); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 169 (July 20)
[hereinafter Certain Expenses of the United Nations]. The Assembly has on several occa-
sions authorized the deployment of "observers" in areas tom by civil conflict. E.g., G.A.
Res.49/137, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994)
(Guatemala); G.A. Res. 47/20B, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 21, U.N. Doc.
A/47/49 (1992) (joint U.N./O.A.S. civilian mission to Haiti).
44. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTR arts. 10, 13, 61, 62.
45. This action was taken in coordination with the OAS and the "Esquipulas II"
agreement. See Letter Dated 27 August 1987 from the Representatives of Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 42d Year, Supp.
forJuly-Sept. 1987, at 92, U.N. Doc. S/19085-A/42/521 (1987); 1991 REPORT ON EUac-
TIONS, supra note 25, at 10-13.
46. The General Assembly has suggested that an "international dimension" should
be a prerequisite for the "exceptional" activity of U.N. electoral assistance. G.A. Res. 46/
137, supra note 28, at 209; 1991 REPORT ON ELEcONS, supra note 25, at 15.
47. See 1992 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 28, at 15. Because election verifica-
tion in Haiti required a security function, a debate over jurisdiction between the Security
Council and the General Assembly also developed. See Stoelting, supra note 26, at 381-
83. Some countries argued that sending military personnel to monitor the election was
beyond the Council's authority under the Charter since the circumstances in Haiti did
not clearly pose any threat to international peace as required for Security Council
actions under Chapter VIL See, e.g., Haiti Says U.N. Election Aid Critical For Future Gov-
ernment, REuTrms, July 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. Unable
to resolve these issues, the Council agreed to send the matter to the General Assembly to
consider Haiti's request. Id.; Paul Lewis, Haiti Wants U.N. to Monitor Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1990, at A10. The General Assembly then voted to send civilian election observ-
ers to Haiti under the direction of the Secretary-General. G.A. Res. 45/2, supra note 41,
at 12. The United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti
(ONUVEH) included deployment of 62 "security observers" despite the continuing
debate over whether such deployment required Security Council approval under the
Charter. See 1991 REPORT ON ELEcrIONS, supra note 25, at 15.
48. See Lewis, supra note 47; Stoelting, supra note 26, at 381-82. Before its involve-
ment in the international effort to supervise elections in Nicaragua in 1990, the U.N. had
never monitored an election in an independent sovereign state despite many requests to
do so. Id. at 372, 377-78.
Vol. 29
1996 Evolution or Expediency
tation of the subject government. 49 Nevertheless, a number of states have
rejected such U.N. assistance, alleging potential ultra vires interference in
the domestic affairs of member states. These states argue that electoral
processes are quintessentially domestic and therefore assistance in this
area is outside U.N. authority and competence under Article 2(7) of the
Charter.50
General Assembly resolutions regarding electoral assistance directly
reflect accommodations to such sentiments and ambivalence regarding
even "invited" collective action to support democracy within member
states. In seemingly contradictory resolutions passed each year since 1988,
for example, the Assembly has alternatively given strong endorsement to
electoral assistance and popular sovereignty,51 and admonished that such
49. See 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 26, at 1, 27; infra notes 110-12 and
accompanying text. Thus, in both Nicaragua and Haiti, the government in power specifi-
cally requested U.N. assistance. See Lewis, supra note 47; Stoelting, supra note 26, at
379, 381. See, e.g., UNrTED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; LErrER DATED 17 JuLY 1990
FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESNrATIVES OF THE BAHAMAS, COLOMBIA AND HAITI TO THE
UNrED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SEcRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/44/965 (1990);
U.N. Doc. A/44/375, supra note 40 (presenting and approving Nicaragua's request that
the U.N. establish an Observer Mission to verify its electoral process). The transitional
government of Ethiopia, which had close connections with the Eritrean nationalists,
requested the mission in Eritrea. See Eritrea: U.N. 'Peace-Building' Gives Birth to New
Nation, supra note 4.
50. See Ebersole, supra note 26, at 96-97; Lewis, supra note 47; Stoelting, supra note
26, at 381-82. See, e.g., UNrrED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; ENHANcING Tm EFFEcTIVE-
NESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, at 5-10, U.N. Doc. A/46/616 (1991) (replies of Governments of China, Colom-
bia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Mexico); id. at 15 (China), 17 (Columbia), 18 (Cuba); U.N.
Doc. A/45/PV.29, supra note 29, at 62-63, 68. Some states appear ready only to support
limited "technical assistance" by the U.N. E.g., U.N. Doc. A/46/616, supra, at 21 (Ecua-
dor), 23 (Indonesia), 29-30 (Mexico). How such benign assistance rendered at the
request of a universally recognized government could constitute "interference" under
Article 2(7) is at best puzzling. See generally Louis Henkin, Human Rights and Domestic
Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 21 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
51. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/190, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 208, U.N.
Doc. A/49/49 (1994); G.A. Res. 48/131, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 250,
U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993); G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 28, at 209; G.A. Res. 45/150,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990); G.A. Res. 43/
157, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 226, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989). Each of
these resolutions endorsing election rights and international involvement in their protec-
tion has been issued under the caption "Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Periodic and Genuine Elections." Although strongly endorsing elections, the tension
between international promotion of democratic governance through free elections and
state sovereignty is also directly reflected in the language of these resolutions. In GA.
Res. 46/137, for example, the Assembly "(sitresses its conviction that periodic and genu-
ine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect
the rights and interests of the governed." G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 28, at 209. Yet, in
the same resolution, the Assembly also
[rlecogniz[es] that there is no single political system or electoral method.., and
that... [international efforts] should not call into question each State's sover-
eign right, in accordance with the will of its people, freely to choose and develop
its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform
to the preferences of other States.
Id. The resolution also affirms that "electoral verification by the United Nations should
remain an exceptional activity to be undertaken in well-defined circumstances, primar-
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assistance should only be given "in special circumstances... in strict con-
formity with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of states."5 2 More recent guidelines on electoral assistance,
while silent on the need for an "international dimension," focus on state
consent and limit intrusive forms of U.N. involvement53 to cases author-
ized by the Security Council or General Assembly.5 4
The U.N. policy of providing electoral assistance demonstrates a sig-
nificant commitment to democracy. At the same time, however, its activi-
ties are also premised on and limited by an overriding deference to state
sovereignty. Most significantly, the U.N.'s efforts to promote democracy
prior to the coup in Haiti were strictly limited in scope to instances in
which consent was given by the government in power or by the parties to
an ongoing conflict.55 Thus, in deference to the principle of non-interfer-
ence, receipt of such assistance has been strictly voluntary. The U.N.'s
response to the coup in Haiti, however, is an important departure from this
consent-based model.
II. Restoring Democracy: The United Nations Response to the 1991
Coup in Haiti
U.N. election observers, with the General Assembly's endorsement, were
fly in situations with a clear international dimension." Id. The later resolutions favoring
electoral assistance have omitted much of this language in favor of referencing guide-
lines developed by the Secretary-General. E.g., G.A. Res. 48/131, supra.
52. G.A. Res. 49/180, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 198, U.N. Doc. A/49/
49 (1994). See also G.A. Res. 48/124, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 243, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (1993); G.A. Res. 47/130, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 204,
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992); G.A. Res. 46/130, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
202, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); G.A. Res. 45/151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.
49A, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990); G.A. Res. 44/127, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). This series of resolutions emphasizing Arti-
cle 2(7) and the "domestic" nature of electoral processes, has been entitled "Respect for
the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-interference in the Internal Affairs of States
in Their Electoral Processes."
53. Supervising and organizing an election, as well as verifying electoral results are
examples of more intrusive U.N. involvement.
54. See 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 26, at 27-31. The Secretary-General's
1991 report on election assistance emphasizes an apparent consensus that such activity
would only be justified in exceptional cases involving a "clear international dimension."
1991 REPORT ON ELECTIOrNS, supra note 25, at 15; G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 28, at 209.
Although the guidelines and Assembly resolutions are now silent on the issue, it would
appear that the "international dimension" criterion is largely subsumed in the require-
ments for authorization from the Security Council or General Assembly for verification,
organization and supervision of elections. See 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note
26, at 27-31.
55. There is, therefore, a critical distinction between activities which promote
democracy through electoral assistance and potential U.N. actions to preserve or restore
democratic rule. The former are undertaken solely upon the request of the member
state or parties to a conflict. See supra note 49; infra notes 116, 125-33. The latter
activities are likely to involve mandatory measures taken pursuant to limiting Charter
criteria and do not require the State's consent. See infra notes 108-18 and accompany-
ing text.
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instrumental in achieving the first free and fair election in Haiti's history.5 6
In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President by sixty-
seven percent of the popular vote in an election widely endorsed as free
and fair.57 Sadly, circumstances soon proved that free elections alone can-
not create a genuine, lasting democracy. Both the military and those with
entrenched economic power interests in Haiti perceived Aristide as a direct
threat to their continued dominance. 58 On September 30, 1991, only nine
months after Aristide's taking office, military officers forced Aristide at gun
point to board a plane for the United States and declared an interim mili-
tary government.59 As many as 3,000 unconfirmed deaths were reported
during the coup and its aftermath.60
Within two days of the coup, the Haitian representative to the United
Nations and the Council President brought the situation before the Secur-
ity Council which met informally in small groups.61 A number of coun-
tries, including Romania, China and India, argued against convening a
formal meeting of the Council because, in their view, the usurpation of
power in Haiti was a domestic matter beyond Security Council compe-
tence.62 On October 3, 1991, however, President Aristide formally
addressed the Security Council and requested its assistance in restoring a
democratic government in Haiti.63 Despite Aristide's plea, a majority of
Security Council members continued to oppose any action in response to
56. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS; REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI PREPARED BY MR. PHILIPPE TEx.
iER, INDEPENDENT EXPERT, IN ACCORDANCE wiTH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLU-
TION 1990/56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/33/Add.1 (1991). See also UNrrED NATIONS,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY; ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE To HAIT: NOTE BY THE SEcRETARY-GENERAL,
U.N. Doc. A/45/870 (1990) (Report of ONUVEH on Electoral Assistance to Haiti).
57. See 1991 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 25, at 15; Haiti Holds Free Democratic
Elections with UN Help, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1991, at 62-64; Haitians Overwhelmingly Elect
Populist Priest to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al.
58. Howard W. French, Haiti's Ruling Elite Reach 'Decisive Moment,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1993, at A13; see Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis, in ENFORCING RESTRAITr, supra note 15,
at 119, 130-31; Howard French, Haiti's Junta Leader Talks of 'Right Path' Despite Signs of
Upheaval in Army, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at L3.
59. 1991 U.N.Y.B. 151-52, U.N. Sales No. E.92.I.1.; Haiti's Aristide Ousted in Armed
Forces Coup, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 1991, at 1A.
60. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS; SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAm: REPORT SUBMITTED BY MR. MARCO
TULio BRUNI CELLI, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMISSION RESOLUTION
1993/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/55 (1994); Aristide: Punishment Is First Step to Hai-
tian Reconciliation, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 17, 1991, at 2B.
61. Evelyn Leopold, Haitian Envoys Blast U.N. Council for Failing to Intervene,
REUTERS, Oct. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
62. See Alan Elsner, U.S. May Use Marines for American Evacuation from Haiti,
RETRS, Oct. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Thomas Friedman,
U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti and Refuses to Recognize Junta, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991,
at Al; David Haskel, Western Hemisphere Closes Ranks Against Haiti's Military Junta,
REUTERS, Oct. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Leopold, supra
note 61; OAS Tentatively OKs Sanctions Against Haiti, CH. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1991, at C6.
63. See UNrrED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE
THREE THOUSAND AND ELEVENTH MEETING, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3011 (1991); S.C. Res. 23098,
U.N. Doc. S/23098 (1991) (letter to Security Council from Haitian Permanent Rep. to
U.N.). See also 1991 U.N.Y.B., supra note 59, at 152.
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the coup. 6 4 In their view, the coup was strictly a domestic affair posing no
threat to international peace and, thus, any action would be beyond the
Security Council's authority under the Charter.65 The Council therefore
declined to take action other than to issue a statement condemning the
coup and expressing approval for the activities of the Organization of
American States (OAS) pursuant to Article 54 of the U.N. Charter.66
President Aristide subsequently addressed the General Assembly,
which voted by consensus on October 11, 1991, to condemn the coup and
to demand Aristide's immediate return to power.67 Using tepid language
tempered by concerns over interference in Haiti's domestic affairs,68 the
General Assembly also appealed to all states to consider voluntarily sup-
porting the economic sanctions imposed by the OAS. 69 Few states, if any,
64. Paul Lewis, U.N. Stops Short of Haiti Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A8.
See also Bruno Franceschi, U.N. Security Council Gives Aristide Spectacular, But Limited,
Support, AGENCE FRACE PRESSE, Oct. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
Files; Security Council Strongly Condemns Coup, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Oct. 4, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires Files.
65. Thomas L. Friedman, Haiti's Coup: Test Case for Bush's New World Order, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A8; Security Council Strongly Condemns Coup, supra note 64. New-
swires widely reported that China and seven members of the non-aligned movement
(Cuba, Ecquaor, India, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zimbabwe and Yemen) opposed Council
action on grounds that the coup was an internal domestic affair. See, e.g., Aristide Tells
U.N. Security Council Coup Is Threat To All Democracies, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1991, at
A22; Anthony Goodman, Haiti's President Appeals for U.N. Support, Wins Moral Backing,
REUrmtS, Oct. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Mikhail
Kochetkov, Security Council Discusses Situation in Haiti, RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY
ITAR-TASS, Oct. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Evelyn Leopold,
U.N. General Assembly Demands Reversal of Coup in Haiti, REUTERS, Oct. 11, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Rajir Tiwari, Haiti: U.N. Vacillates Under Yet
Another Test, INR PRss SERVICE, Oct. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File. However, the record of the Security Council meeting does not itself clearly reflect
this opposition, perhaps because no member of the Council called for serious action.
The members' statements primarily consisted of vague assertions of support for the OAS
effort and unilateral suspensions of foreign aid to Haiti. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.301 1, supra
note 63. The lack of Council members' public opposition may reflect the Council's
apparent penchant for making decisions behind the scenes before public meetings. See
generally Loie Feuerle, Informal Consultation: A Mechanism in Security Council Decision-
Making, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 267 (1985). See also, Reisman, supra note 15, at 85-
86.
66. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3011, supra note 63. See Norman Kempster & Stanley Meisler,
Deposed Haitian Asks for U.N., U.S. Help, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A20; Lewis, supra
note 64. See also UNrrED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMaBLY; THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI: REPORT OF THE SECR YARY-GENERAL, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/47/599
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 SEc.-GE,. REPORT ON HAITI]; 1991 U.N.Y.B., supra note 59, at
151-52. The Security Council has adopted the practice of issuing statements which gen-
erally represent the views of current Council members through the Council President.
See RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (1946-1992)
(Karel Wellens ed., 1993) at ix [hereinafter RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS].
67. G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/46/49
(1991).
68. See Leopold, supra note 65; Trevor Rowe, U.N. Strongly Condemns Haitian Coup,
WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1991, at A18.
69. G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 67. On September 30, the OAS Permanent Council
convened an Ad Hoc Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which voted to con-
demn the coup and to recommend hemisphere-wide economic sanctions. OAS, Ad Hoc
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actually followed this reconmendation.70 Soon thereafter, the Assembly
requested that an independent expert prepare a report to the U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights on human rights conditions in Haiti after the
coup.7 1
OnJuly 15, 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council
that, upon the invitation of President Aristide and the OAS, and pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 46/7, U.N. personnel would participate in
a negotiating mission to Haiti.72 On November 10, 1992, some thirteen
months after the coup, the OAS Permanent Council formally requested
additional U.N. involvement supporting its efforts to restore democracy in
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Support for Democracy in Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/
MRE/RES.2/91 (1991); OAS, Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Support to
the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.1/91 (1991). See OAS,
Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Restoration of Democracy in Haiti,
OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.3/92 (1992) (reinforcing the trade sanctions and requesting
that OAS states deny port access to violating ships). These actions were taken pursuant
to the Organization's recently adopted Resolution on Representative Democracy. OAS,
General Assembly, 5th Plen. Sess., Representative Democracy, AG/Res.1080(XXI-0/91)
(1991) [hereinafter Santiago Declaration]. This important resolution reaffirmed that
"[t]he Preamble of the Charter of the OAS establishes that representative democracy is
an indispensable condition for... peace" and committed the OAS membership to its
defense. Id. The OAS has no power to issue binding resolutions. See, e.g., Acevedo,
supra note 58, at 135-36.
70. See generally Christina M. Cerna, The Case of Haiti Before The OAS, 86 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 378 (1992); Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to
Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala,
25 INTro-Am. L. REv. 393 (1994). This embargo proved to be porous and largely ineffec-
tual due to waivers granted to certain U.S. companies and the European Community's
refusal to enforce it. Cerna, supra, at 381-82. See Acevedo, supra note 58, at 136-37;
Schnably, supra, at 483-95. See also Clinton's Haiti Policy Will Be Broader Than Bush's,
Aide Says, Raurms,JarL 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
71. See G.A. Res. 46/138, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 211, U.N. Doc. A/
46/49 (1991). In reports issued each year since 1991 the independent expert, Marco
Celli of Venezuela, has condemned the military-backed regime for widespread human
rights abuses. See Report Rips Abuses in Haiti, MIMI HERAL, Feb. 26, 1993, at 12A.
E.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/55, supra note 60; UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY;
SrruATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAm: NoTE BY THE SEcRErARY-GENRAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/
513 (1994); UNrn NATIONS, GENERAL AssEML-y; SrIUATION of: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAm:
NoT BY THE SECRE ARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/48/561 (1993); UN'IED NATIONS, ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF
HUMIAN RIGHTS IN HAITI SUBMITTED BY MR. MARCO TuLio BRUmN CELu, SPECIAL RAPPORTEURp,
IN ACCORDANCE wrrH COMMISSION RESOLUTION 1992/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/47
(1993). Another independent U.N. expert, Philippe Texier, was appointed by the Com-
mission on Human Rights to investigate human rights conditions in Haiti in 1990. See
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HuMi RIGHTS; REPORT
ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN HAITI PREPARED BY MR. PHILIPPE TExIm, INDEPENDENT
EXPERT, IN ACCORDANCE VinH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION 1990/56, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1991/33 (1991) [hereinafter TamaxI REPORT]; E/CN.4/1991/33/Add.1,
supra note 56.
72. See 1992 SEC.-GEN. REPORT ON HAI, supra note 66, at 10; El Salvador: UN
Observer Mission Monitors Human Rights, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 35. This mission
led to a September 10, 1992, agreement with the defacto government of Haiti to deploy
18 OAS civilian observers in Port-au-Prince. 1992 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAITI, supra note
66, at 12.
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Haiti. 73 The U.N. General Assembly responded two weeks later by request-
ing that the Secretary-General take measures in cooperation with the OAS
to resolve the crisis in Haiti. 74 The Secretary-General responded by
appointing former Argentine Ambassador Dante Caputo as the U.N. Special
Envoy for Haiti on December 11, 1992.7s Soon thereafter the Secretary-
General of the OAS also appointed Mr. Caputo as the OAS Special Envoy
for Haiti.76 Mr. Caputo was given the mandate to negotiate a peaceful reso-
lution of the crisis, including the potential deployment of human rights
observers throughout the country. 7 7 After many false starts, Mr. Caputo
finally secured an invitation from the de facto Haitian government 78 to
allow a group of human rights observers into Haiti. 7 9 As a result, a civilian
force of 200 to 500 human rights observers from both the U.N. and the
OAS were to be stationed throughout Haiti with no significant restrictions
on their freedom of movement.80 Although approximately 180 observers
were eventually deployed,8 1 the military government refused to fulfill its
promises regarding the observers and repeatedly scuttled plans to restore
73. See OAS, Permanent Council, Reestablishment of Democracy in Haiti, OEA/Ser/
G/CP/RES/594 (923/92) (1992). See also OAS, Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs (Haiti), Reinstatement of Democracy in Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.4/92,
corr.1 (1992).
74. G.A. Res. 47/20, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/47/49
(1992). See UNrrm NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND
HuMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI: REPORT OF THE SEcRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/47/908 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm].
75. 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note 74, at 4.
76. Id. at 4-7.
77. President Aristide, after consultations with Special Envoy Caputo, specifically
requested that the U.N. and OAS mobilize a "multinational presence" to monitor human
rights in Haiti as a precursor to the gradual elimination of OAS sanctions. See 1993
SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note 74, Annex I, at 8-9.
78. By June 1992, the military authorities had installed Marc Bazin as prime minis-
ter. See Tony Pugh & Don Bohning, U.N. Embargo of Haiti Urged, MMI HERALD, June
10, 1993, at 1A. In January 1993, the military also sponsored Senate elections widely
condemned as illegitimate by the international community. 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON
HAm, supra note 74, Annex II, at 5. See Mike McQueen & Harold Maass, Troops Rally as
General Returns to Haiti, MiAmI HERAL,July 4, 1993, at 18A. Nevertheless, because Gen.
Raoul Cedras and the military government continued to wield real power in Haiti, nego-
tiations all but ignored Bazin's puppet civilian government. On June 8, 1993, Bazin
resigned, leaving the army to negotiate without a civilian front. See Paul Lewis, U.N.
Council Plans to Order Full Ban on Oil for Haiti, N.Y. TimEs, June 10, 1993, at Al.
79. 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note 74, at 6-7. See Julia Preston, Haiti
Agrees To Monitoring By U.N., O.A.S., WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1993, at A28. The General
Assembly endorsed this plan in April, creating the joint OAS/U.N. International Civilian
Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). G.A. Res. 47/20B, supra note 43. The OAS initially was
allowed to send a small number of observers into Haiti in September 1992, but the mili-
tary government severely restricted their access to the population. See S.C. Res. 940,
supra note 11;J.P. Slavin, Good Pay, Tough Job: U.N. Recruiting Rights Monitors For Haiti,
MiAm HERALD, Feb. 14, 1993, at 24A
80. See 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note 74, Annex III, at 6-7.
81. Deployment of these observers was very slow. By June, 1993, only between 130
and 180 observers were in place and their operations were extremely limited. See Doug-
las Farah, Haiti Opens, a Bit, to Aristide, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at A25; Harold
Maass, Halt in Talks Has Brought Rise in Beatings, Arrests in Haiti, MIMi HERALD, June 3,
1993, at 10A; Randolph Ryan, Don't Let Haiti Down, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1993, at 13.
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President Aristide to power.8 2
In May, frustrated with the military's intransigence, the United States,
France and Venezuela, as well as Mr. Caputo, pushed the U.N. Security
Council to consider imposing a worldwide mandatory economic embargo
against Haiti.83 In early June, Haiti's Permanent Representative to the
U.N. 84 requested that the Council make the OAS embargo mandatory on a
worldwide basis.85 On June 16, 1993, over twenty months after the coup,
the Security Council invoked mandatory economic sanctions against Haiti
under Chapter VII of the Charter.8 6 The Council declined, however, to
authorize enforcement of this embargo by force. 87 The Haitian military
almost immediately agreed to direct negotiations with President Aristide
and, less than two weeks after sanctions took effect, agreed to a plan to
restore Aristide to power.88 Upon the Haitian Parliament's approval of
82. See, e.g., Get The Blockade Ready, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 1993, at 12A; Haiti:
Patience Wearing Thin, MIAI HERALD, Feb. 8, 1993, at 10A. A key reversal during these
negotiations was the military's decision to reject an agreement which would have placed
500 to 1000 U.N. police personnel in Haiti. See Douglas Farah, Haiti Rejects Proposal to
End Crisis: Rulers' Move Risks Tougher Sanctions, WASH. POST, May 25, 1993, at A15.
83. See Farah, supra note 82; Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Plans to Order Full Ban on Oil
for Haiti, N.Y. TmEs, June 10, 1993, at Al; U.N. Envoy Calls for Strong Sanctions Against
Haiti's Military Regime, UPI, May 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
84. After the coup, the Aristide government retained its credentials as Haiti's repre-
sentative in the United Nations. The continued recognition of the Aristide government
was consistent with the international community's insistence throughout the crisis that
the de facto government of Haiti was illegitimate because it had taken power illegally
through unconstitutional means. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 74, at 21; U.N.
Doc. S/PV.301 1, supra note 63. Traditional international law practices would, however,
have supported giving Haiti's U.N. seat to a coup representative. See infra notes 187-89.
85. See UNInD NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; LER DATED 7 JUNE 1993 FROM THE
PERMANENT RERESENTATIVE OF HAITI TO THE UNrrED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/25958 (1993).
86. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9. See Christopher Marquis, U.N. Slaps Sweeping Sanc-
tions On Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, June 17, 1993, at 1A; Julia Preston, U.N. Votes To Clamp
Oil Embargo On Haiti; Military Can Stave Off Sanction by Planning For Aristide's Return,
WASH. PoST, June 17, 1993, at Al. The sanctions created a worldwide embargo against
oil and arms shipments to Haiti and demanded that states freeze the de facto govern-
ment's assets. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9. See Christopher Marquis, Aristide, Army Foe
To Meet, MIMI HERALD, June 23, 1993, at 1A. A primary purpose of the sanctions was to
force Haitian military leaders into good faith negotiations. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3238, supra note 17, at 14, 18-19 (comments of Venezuela and the United States).
87. Lead by Brazil, Latin American countries successfully lobbied against authoriz-
ing direct enforcement measures because of fears that a blockade would set a precedent
for using force against a state not posing a threat to its neighbors. See Susan Benesch,
U.N. Votes For Embargo Against Haiti, ST. PE-ERSBURrG TnMs, June 17, 1993, at Al; Chris-
topher Marquis, U.S. Might Enforce Haiti Oil Embargo, MIAMI HERALD, June 19, 1993, at
1A. Despite the Council's refusal to authorize enforcement through force, the U.S.
announced that its Coast Guard might enforce the embargo by boarding ships after
securing the consent of the vessel's flag state. Id.
88. See Christopher Marquis, Aristide Signs Accord, MIAMI HERALD, July 4, 1993, at
1A; Julia Preston, Aristide, Officer Sign Haiti Pact; N.Y. Talks Produce Formula To Rein-
state President on Oct. 30, WASH. PoST, July 4, 1993, at Al. The "Governor's Island
Agreement," reached on July 3, 1993, provided for the suspension of economic sanc-
tions after the appointment of a Prime Minister approved by Parliament and Aristide's
return to Haiti by October 30, 1993. The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in
Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Supp. for July-Sept. 1993,
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Robert Malval as Prime Minister in August, the Council briefly suspended
sanctions.89 However, on October 13, 1993, the Council voted to reimpose
sanctions on October 18 in response to escalating political violence in
Haiti and the obvious failure of the Governor's Island Agreement.90
During the ensuing months, the Security Council reaffirmed its
resolve to restore democracy in Haiti by ordering a forcible naval block-
U.N. Doc. S/26063-A/47/975 (1993). See 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note
74. It also called for full amnesty, the resignation of key coup figures including Gen.
Raoul Cedras and Police Chief Michael Francoise, and the deployment of an interna-
tional "police force" which would "modernize the army." U.N. Doc. S/26063-A/47/975,
supra, I1 2-5 (reprinting the text of the Governor's Island Agreement). In a subsequent
agreement reached on July 16, 1993, known as the "Pact of New York," the parties also
agreed to a resolution of the disputed January 1993 Haitian Senate election. Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Supp. for July-Sept. 1993, U.N. Doc. S/
26297-A/47/1000 (1993). See Haitian Politicians Sign Truce, MiAMi HERALD, July 18,
1993, at 1A. Political oppression and continuing human rights violations, however, scut-
tled the agreement and extinguished the chance for a peaceful return to democratic rule.
See Don Bohning, Murder, Mayhem on Rise in Haiti as Aristide Prepares to Return, MiAMI
HERALD, Sept. 18, 1993, at 1A; Don Bohning, 7 Weeks After Haiti Pact, Uncertainty
Reigns, MiAMi HERALD, Aug. 22, 1993, at 23A; Paul Lewis, U.N. Again Imposes Sanctions
on Haiti After Pact Fails, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al; Christopher Marquis, Haitian
Killings Linked to Brash Police Chief, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 1993, at 8A; Christopher
Marquis, Rights Abuses Threaten Accord, Aristide Warns, MiAMI HERALD, Aug. 19, 1993, at
IA. This wave of intimidation and violence by police auxiliaries included the infamous
political assassination of Antoine Izmery, a prominent Aristide supporter. See UNrTED
NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE SITUATION OF DEMocRAcY Aim HuMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI:
NOTE BY THE SEcRErARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/48/532 (1993) (interim report of
MICIVIH); Michael Norton, Gunmen Assassinate Leading Aristide Supporter in Haiti,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 1993, at 1U
89. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 121, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1993). See White House Hails Suspension of U.N. Embargo Against Haiti, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 28, 1993, at 18A. In September, the Security Council authorized the creation and
deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was to consist of
approximately 1200 police trainers and military engineers. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR,
48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 122-25, U.N. Doc., S/INF/49 (1993). See U.N. Council Votes to
Send Peacekeeping Force to Haiti, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 24, 1993, at A3. On October 11,
1993, however, a government-organized mob in Port-au-Prince prevented the U.S.S.
Harlan County from delivering the first large installment of lightly armed troops. See
Kenneth Freed, Haitians Yell "Kill Whites," Obstruct Ship, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 12,
1993, at Al.
90. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 125, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1993). See Paul Lewis, U.N. Again Imposes Sanctions On Haiti After Pact Fails, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al. See also supra note 88 (discussing Governor's Island Agree-
ment). Much of the violence was apparently orchestrated by Port-au-Price Police Chief,
Col. Michael Francois. Id. On October 14, gunmen shot and killed Aristide's Justice
Minister, Guy Malary. See Howard W. French, Haiti Justice Minister Slain in Defiance of
U.S. Warning to Military to Keep Peace, N.Y. TiaES, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al. As a result of
escalating violence, MICIVIH was forced to withdraw from Haiti by mid-October.
UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASEMBLY; STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION TO
HAITI, U.N. Doc. A/48/532/Add.2 (1993) (second addendum to the interim report of
MICIVIH). See Garry Pierre-Pierre, Rights Monitors Are Pulled Out of Haiti, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1993, at A4. Starting in January 1994, U.N. observers began to return, but by
June only 70 had been deployed. UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL AsSEMBLY; NOTE BY THE SEC-
RE'ARY-GENEtA: ADDENDUM, U.N. Doc. A/48/532/Add.3 (1994) (third addendum to the
interim report of MICIVIH).
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ade9 l and full trade embargo. 92 The United States also increased pressure
on the military government by imposing travel restrictions, freezing
assets,9 3 and raising the specter of military action.94 None of these meas-
ures, which had devastating effects on the Haitian population,95 appeared
to move the military toward compromise. 96
On July 29, 1994, the Aristide government requested "prompt and
decisive action" by the U.N.97 At least some members of the Council
viewed this request as an implicit authorization for forcible U.N. assist-
ance.98 OnJuly 31, thirty-four months after the coup, the Security Council
passed Resolution 940 which, for the first time in U.N. history,99 author-
ized member states to utilize force to restore democracy in an independent
member state.' 00 Accepting the invitation obviously intended for it, the
91. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 125-27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49
(1993).
92. S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. & Dec. at 47-49, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50
(1994). This resolution also called for the departure of key military leaders from Haiti
and ordered their personal assets frozen. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Votes Tougher
Embargo On Haitian Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 1.
93. See, e.g., U.S. Blocks Assets of Those Obstructing Return of Aristide, MIMIu HERALD,
Oct. 23, 1993, at 24A.
94. Howard French, Standoff in Haiti; As U.S. Ships Arrive, Haiti General Refuses to
Budge, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1993, at A6; Michael R. Gordon, Standoff in Haiti: U.S. Strat-
egy: U.S. Troops Stage Military Exercise with Eye on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at Al;
U.S. Not Ruling Out Use of Force, U.S. Envoy Says, MIaI HERALD, Oct. 18, 1993, at 6A
(quoting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright). The OAS urged stronger
U.N. action and a broader mandate for UNMIH during this period. See OAS, Ad Hoc
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Haiti, Call for the Return to Democracy in
Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.6/94 (1994).
95. See Schnably, supra note 70, at 489-95.
96. If anything, these economic measures, through which some coup leaders report-
edly were making handsome profits, see Herbert Gold, Haiti's New and Old Rich, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at A23, increased the obstinance of Haiti's military. Human rights
abuses and political oppression increased steadily. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Months
of Terror Bring Rising Toll of Deaths in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1994, at Al; Harold
Maass, Observers: Terror Is Worsening, MIAMI HERLD, Apr. 13, 1994, at 12A. On July
11, 1994, the military ordered the U.N. civilian observer force (MICIVIH) to leave Haiti.
See Multinational Force Dispatched to Pave Way for Aristide's Return, U.N. CHRON., Dec.
1994, at 21; Garry Pierre-Pierre, Haiti Orders Out Foreign Monitors of Human Rights, N.Y.
TIM S, July 12, 1994, at Al. Two weeks later, onJuly 27, MICIVIH reported an "unprece-
dented human rights crisis" in the country. See U.N. Doc. A/48/532/Add.3, supra note
90.
97. UNITED NATIONS, SEcURriY COUNCIL; LETTER DATED 29Juty 1994 FROM THE PEmi.A-
NENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HAITI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL, U.N. Doc. S/1994/905 (1994); UNrrED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; LETTER DATED
30 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIV OF HAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURTrY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/1994/910 (1994)
(confirming Aristide's agreement with Resolution 910). See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413,
supra note 12.
98. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12; infra notes 116, 233 and accompanying
text.
99. See infra notes 187-96, 238 and accompanying text; U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra
note 12.
100. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11. See Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Authorizes Invasion of
Haiti to be Led by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al; Security Council Authorizes Mul-
tinational Force 'To Use All Necessary Means' to Facilitate Departure of Military From Haiti,
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United States eventually announced plans for an "international" invasion
force, primarily consisting of U.S. military units, to restore Aristide to
power.101 With the invasion apparently only minutes away, former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter reached an eleventh-hour agreement with the Haitian
military to restore Aristide to power. 10 2 By the end of September over
17,000 U.S. soldiers were peacefully deployed in Haiti, preparing the way
for Aristide's eventual return.10 3 On October 15, the U.N.'s first attempt to
restore democracy in a member state reached a climax as President Aris-
tide triumphantly returned to Port-au-Prince.10 4
Return of President Aristide, FED. NEws SERviCE, Aug. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File (with summary of Council debate). The resolution, citing Chapter
VII and "determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to
peace," specifically authorized "member states to form a multi-national force.., to use
all necessary means" to remove the "military leadership" and restore Aristide to power.
Council members Brazil and China abstained, arguing that the use of force in Haiti did
not conform to the Charter or customary practice. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12,
at 12. Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela addressed the Council as interested states
under Council Provisional Rule of Procedure 37 and argued against the resolution on
similar grounds. They also cited the principle of non-interference in Haiti's "internal
affairs." Id. at 4-8. Resistance to the use of force on such grounds by China, Brazil, and
Venezuela appears technically inconsistent with their prior support for Resolution 841.
Both economic sanctions under Article 41 and force under Article 42 require the exist-
ence of a threat to international peace as a prerequisite. Presumably, these states would
endorse the creation of legally meaningful distinctions between sanctions and force
based upon the degree to which a situation threatens international peace. The same
result is possible by emphasizing the requirement that force must be necessary due to
the failure of Article 41 sanctions. See id. at 8-10 (comments of Brazil and China).
101. After six weeks of international and domestic maneuvering regarding a potential
invasion, see e.g., James Brooke, Latins Join in New Effort to Get Haitian Leaders to Step
Down, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1994, at A2, President Clinton announced in a televised
address to the nation that the Haitian military's "time was up." See Douglas Jehl, Clinton
Addresses Nation on Threat to Invade Haiti; Tells Dictators to Get Out, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 16,
1994, at Al.
102. See Ann Devroy, Carter Swayed Clinton into Bending in Talks, WASH. PosT, Sept.
20, 1994, at Al; Elaine Sciolino, On the Brink of War, A Tense Battle of Wills, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1994, at Al.
103. See Haiti: Multinational Force Dispatched to Pave Way for Aristide's Return, U.N.
CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 20-22; Perry: Haiti Showing 'Significant Progress,' supra note 14.
Eventually the multinational force (MNF) included over 20,000 personnel. Haiti: Mul-
tinational Force, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 6. Among other things, U.S. forces removed
heavy weapons from the military, partially disarmed paramilitary forces, reformed the
police and generally enforced the September 18, 1994, Carter agreement. See, e.g., A
Flexing of Muscle in Haiti, MIu HERALD, Sept. 23, 1994, at 1A; Steven Greenhouse, U.S.
Forces to Widen Role in Curbing Haiti Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at Al; John
Kifner, Hit or Miss, U.S. Presses Hunt for Arms in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at A3.
104. John Kifner, Aristide in a Joyful Return, Urges Reconciliation in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1994, at Al. See Haiti & Multinational Force Dispatched to Pave Way for Aris-
tide's Return, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 20-23. In April 1995, the U.S.-led MNF was
finally replaced by nearly 7,000 blue-helmeted UNMIH troops. See Larry Rohter, U.N.
Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti, N.Y. TuIAs, Apr. 2, 1995, at A14. Exercising its broad
mandate, see Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Supp. for July-Sept.
1993, U.N. Doc. S/26480 (1993), these transitional forces reorganized the Haitian police
and in July 1995, helped supervise national elections. The conduct of those elections
has been widely criticized. See Steven Greenhouse, Election Monitor Criticizes Haitian
Vote for Widespread Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at A5; In Haiti, Democracy Still
Flounders, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A12.
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UII. Future United Nations Efforts to Restore Democracy: Defining
the Debate
The 1990 coup in Haiti raised the stakes significantly in the U.N.'s new-
found commitment to democracy. The coup expanded the focus of debate
from the U.N.'s authority to promote democracy through consensual elec-
toral assistance' 0 5 to its potential role in restoring democracy disrupted by
internal domestic upheaval. It also raised issues regarding the organiza-
tion's potential role, if any, in preserving threatened democracies or in pro-
moting democracy in undemocratic states through non-consensual
measures. Perhaps most importantly, in raising such issues during a
period of expanding Security Council authority, 10 6 the U.N.'s response to
the coup heightened scrutiny of the institution's decision-making and
prompted an important process of self-examination.
01 7
In order to evaluate the implications of the U.N.'s response to the
coup, it is important to briefly review the basic legal doctrines which shape
the debate surrounding such actions. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council is the only institution with mandatory enforcement powers.
10 8
Pursuant to Articles 25, 48 and 49, U.N. members have agreed to under-
take such measures as the Council may order within its defined author-
ity.10 9 The General Assembly has no legislative or enforcement power and
its resolutions, standing on their own, are strictly non-binding recommen-
dations." 0 In essence, the Charter limits meaningful responses to an inter-
national crisis, at least in the form of mandatory enforcement actions, to
the Security Council."' In the context of restoring democracy after action
105. Although such activity has been resisted by some states as unauthorized interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the state, see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text,
increased U.N. involvement in electoral matters seems destined to grow, firmly establish-
ing a significant U.N. role in the promotion of democratic government through consen-
sual means.
106. See infra notes 115-18, 250-56 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
108. U.N. CHARTm arts. 25, 48, 49. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra
note 43, at 156, 162. See generally GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 24, at 25-30; infra
notes 159-60, 216-21.
109. U.N. CHAxR arts. 25, 48, 49.
110. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 43 at 156. The Assembly
does have binding authority over certain issues such as budget authorizations, manage-
ment of "non-strategic" trust territories and, upon the Security Council's recommenda-
tion, expulsion of members, admission of new members, and election of certain officials
(including members of the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC),
the Secretary-General, and non-permanent members of the Security Council). See U.N.
CHARTE arts. 4(2), 5, 16, 17, 23, 61, 85, 97. Some commentators have also argued that
Assembly resolutions can be convincing evidence of customary law. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THiRo) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102 notes (1986); OscAR ScHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE GENERAL COURSE N PuBuc INTERNATIONAL
LAw 111-21 (1982-V Recueil des Cours d'Academie de Droit International, vol. 178).
111. Although the General Assembly may "discuss any questions" relating to interna-
tional peace, including any situation "likely to impair the general welfare or friendly
relations among nations," it may only make recommendations regarding such ques-
tions. U.N. CHARTRa arts. 11, 12, 14. Moreover, once the Security Council begins exer-
cising its peace-keeping functions, the General Assembly may only make
recommendations if so instructed. Id. arts. 12, 14. Thus, although the Assembly has
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by a recalcitrant usurper, the Security Council inevitably plays the determi-
native role, as it did in Haiti.112
The Council's primary, and perhaps exclusive, authority in this
regard, however, is limited to maintaining international peace and secur-
ity.1 13 The international community has never recognized a general Secur-
some authority in the area of peace and security, see Reisman, supra note 15, at 84; supra
note 43 and accompanying text, its powers are limited. See, e.g., Harry H. Almond Jr.,
The Military Activities Case: New Perspectives on the International Court of Justice and
Global Public Order, 21 INT'L LAw. 195, 205 (1987). See also Edwin Smith, The Need for
Effective Multilateral Sanctions, 1992 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 303, 305-06 (describing
U.N. as system designed to preserve freedom of action for World War II victors via the
Security Council).
112. Despite its limitations, the General Assembly could nevertheless play a signifi-
cant role in restoring democracy, particularly in the absence of Security Council action.
For example, the Assembly may, as it did in Haiti, recommend collective actions such as
voluntary economic boycotts or diplomatic sanctions against the target government. See
G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 74; G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 67; G.A. Res. 46/138, supra
note 71. See also G.A. Res. 34/93, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 32, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (requesting oil embargo against South Africa). The Assembly
might also authorize the deployment of human rights observers and, although not with-
out controversy, even peace-keepers, assuming that the target government agrees. See
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 43, at 151-52, 162-63. For example,
the Assembly has authorized deployment of civilian election observers to Nicaragua,
Haiti and Eritrea. See supra notes 39-42. It also sent human rights observers to Haiti in
1993. G.A. Res. 47/20B, supra note 43.
113. Since the U.N. is solely the creation of its sovereign state members, the powers
and authority of its constituent bodies are limited to those granted to them in the Char-
ter as interpreted through custom and practice. All the Security Council's specific pow-
ers granted by the Charter, with the possible exception of some Article 83 powers
relating to "strategic" trusteeship territories, focus on the preservation of international
peace and security. See U.N. CHRRTE arts. 24, 33-34, 36-42, 52-53, 83. Indeed, the U.N.
itself, its structure and its originally conceived purposes, were principally (although not
exclusively) focused on eliminating the "scourge of war" and maintaining international
peace. U.N. CHAR TER pmbl., art. 1. See BENJAMIN B. FERENcz, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
LAW 423-38 (1983); GooDRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 24, at 93-98; THE INTmuNTIONAL
BnIL OF RIGHrs, supra note 50, at 884-87, 962-63. In this regard, there seems little doubt
that maintenance of international peace originally, and at least through the end of the
cold war, meant efforts to end cross-border conflicts. See Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry Into
the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw AM FORCE, supra note 15, at 185,
190-91; Jeane Kirkpatrick, When Should the Tanks Roll?, WASH. PosT, Oct. 17, 1994, at
A19. Recent Council activities reveal, however, that this narrow view of the Council's
authority is giving way to more flexible approaches grounded in practical politics and
expediency. See supra note 15; infra note 117; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Eroding the U.N.
Charter, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1994) (book review). Many, including most Western
powers, would argue that the Charter is "constitutional" in character and requires suffi-
cient interpretive flexibility to allow effective reaction to political realities. See GOODRICH
& HAMBRO, supra note 24, at 204-07. E.g., W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competence to
Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAw AND
FORCE, supra note 15, at 26, 4247. The recent concluding statement of the meeting of
Council members' heads of state, reflects this sentiment by declaring that "the absence
of war ... does not itself insure ... peace .... [I]nstability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats ..... UrTE NATIONS, SECURITY
CouNciL; PROvIsIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE THOusN AND FORTY-SIxTH MEEr-
ING, U.N. Doc.. S/PV.3046 (1992). Accepting this view, the critical question then
becomes, at what point does interpretive flexibility exercised by powerful states through
non-democratic decision-making processes unfairly subvert the will of those being gov-
erned? See infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
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ity Council power to enforce international law or to police its violation in
the absence of a threat to, or a breach of, international peace.114 Nor does
the Security Council, or any other U.N. institution, have an express power
to address human rights violations, such as the denial of democratic rights
in Haiti, through economic sanctions or other compulsory measures.
115
Similarly, U.N. institutions have no express Charter-based authority to
order measures necessary to alleviate humanitarian crises such as those
witnessed in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Absent either an express invita-
tion of the government involved' 16 or a threat to international peace,"1
7
114. The Charter does not authorize the Security Council to enforce international law
generally. The Council's only mandatory powers are exclusively associated with issues
of international peace. See U.N. CHARTRx arts. 24, 25, 39-42, 48-49; supra note 107. See
generally GooDIcH & HAmRO, supra note 24, at 204-13, 237-308.
115. See generally Donoho, supra note 22, at 854-66.
116. Although the issue is not without doubt, intervention at the request of a recog-
nized government in control of the state is typically seen as lawful under traditional
state practice, at least in the absence of a significant insurgency. Case Concerning Mili-
tary and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 LCJ. 14,
126; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1620,
1644-45 (1984). See BROWNLE, supra note 43, at 321-27; MAtANCZUK, supra note 15, at
3; Rein Mullerson, Intervention by Invitation, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 15, at 125,
132. See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRrr. Y.B. ITr'L L. 189 (1985). Thus, theoretically, U.N.
intervention requested by a member state's government should pose no issues regarding
violations of sovereignty or Article 2(7). However, the concept of "invited intervention,"
which also arises in the context of collective self-defense, has been regularly abused. For
example, the United States, the Soviet Union and Iraq each attempted to justify their
invasions of Grenada (U.S.), the Dominican Republic (U.S.), Panama (U.S.), Hungary
(USSR), Czechoslovakia (USSR), Afghanistan (USSR), and Kuwait (Iraq) based upon
some form of "invitation." See John L. Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation and the Poli-
tics of the New World Order, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 15, at 113, 116-19; Mullerson,
supra, at 128-31; Doswald-Beck, supra, at 222-39. See also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Contin-
uing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil Wars, 67 IND. J. 903 (1992) (arguing against
U.N. intervention in civil wars). Moreover, many commentators now seriously question
whether intervention by invitation is permissible to support a government faced with
civil insurrection. See, e.g., Doswald-Beck, supra, at 242-43, 251. See generally THE
INTERNATiONAL BiLu. OF RIGrs, supra note 50, at 945-54. Invited intervention becomes
even more problematic when the government requesting assistance is not in control of
the state, a condition endemic to most coups. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
Thus, with regard to restoring democracy, the concept of "invited intervention" raises a
number of difficult issues left largely unresolved by the U.N.'s action in Haiti. See infra
note 234 and accompanying text.
117. The Security Council has now exercised its authority in at least four recent situa-
tions which appear to have involved primarily humanitarian crises. See S.C. Res. 940,
supra note 11 (Haiti); S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. & Dec. at 10-11, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/50 (1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. & Dec. at 6-
8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994); S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9 (Haiti); S.C. Res. 794, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 63-65, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (Somalia); S.C. Res.
688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 31-32, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991) (protect-
ing Iraqi Kurd and Shiite populations). Creating and protecting safe havens in Bosnia is
another example of this trend. Although the justifications for and implications of Secur-
ity Council action in each of these cases are somewhat ambiguous, see infra notes 131,
162, 166, 169, 178, 252-61 and accompanying text, they appear collectively to reflect an
extension of the Security Council's jurisdiction through an expansive, if not unjustifi-
able, interpretation of threats to peace. See infra notes 131, 162, 166, 169, 178, 249,
253-61 and accompanying text. The phenomenon of an activist Security Council has
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such multilateral interventions could arguably be ultra vires.118
However, the Charter and historical practice provide the Security
Council with considerable latitude and a wide range of options for main-
taining peace. These conflict management options generally fall within
four types of responses, which historically have been pursued in the fol-
lowing order: first, efforts under Chapter VI of the Charter to promote
peaceful, negotiated resolution of disputes; second, peace-keeping, human-
itarian relief and transitional operations authorized by an invitation (i.e.,
consent) of the parties to a conflict; third, non-forcible sanctions including
economic boycotts under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the Charter; and
finally, forcible sanctions, including military action, under Chapter VII,
Article 42 of the Charter. 119 Each category of response has its own criteria
for invocation and can only be ordered if nine of the fifteen Council mem-
bers, including all five permanent representatives, agree.120 Each option is
potentially available to redress the disruption of democracy, but presuma-
bly only if the Council finds that circumstances warrant such action under
the criteria provided in the Charter.
The first set of options, authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter,
focuses on non-forcible steps which the Security Council may take in order
to encourage the peaceful resolution of international disputes. 121 Per
generated a flood of recent literature concerning intervention generally, see supra note
15, and, not coincidentally, reform of the Security Council. See infra note 265. The
General Assembly, in contrast, has general Charter authority to respond to humanita-
rian crises. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-14, 55-85; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 24, at
150-53, 174-88. However, by virtue of Article 2(7), which prohibits U.N. interference in
the domestic affairs of states, and the Assembly's lack of mandatory enforcement author-
ity, the Assembly's response to humanitarian crises is limited to making recommenda-
tions to member states or rendering assistance with the state's consent. See supra notes
43, 108-12 and accompanying text.
118. See Farer, supra note 113, at 185, 190-99; Kirkpatrick, supra note 113; Charles
Krauthammer, Clinton's Little War, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 16, 1994, at A27; O'Connell, supra
note 116, at 904, 908, 912-13. The notion of multilateral humanitarian intervention
through the U.N. has become a popular and controversial variation on the well-worn
subject of humanitarian intervention. See generally supra note 15.
119. Ambiguity in Council resolutions authorizing force in Korea and the Persian
Gulf War has caused some commentators to suggest an alternative justification for col-
lective force, in the form of collective self-defense, authorized by the Council under Arti-
cle 51. Applying this view, the Council may authorize member states to use force to
collectively defend another member state without necessary resort to Article 42. See
generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 Am. J. Irr'L L. 452
(1991).
120. See U.N. CHaRER arts. 23, 27. The "permanent five" members of the Security
Council are the United States, France, the Peoples' Republic of China, the United King-
dom and the Russian Federation. Id. art. 23. At the time of the coup in Haiti, the other
ten council seats were occupied by Austria, Belgium, Cote D'Ivoire, Romania, Zaire,
Cuba, Yemen, Ecuador, India and Zimbabwe. See 1991 U.N.Y.B., supra note 59, at 1053.
When the Council finally imposed economic sancations via Resolution 841 in June
1993, Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Spain and Venezuela occupied the 10 non-permanent seats. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238,
supra note 17. Five of these seats were filled by Nigeria, Argentina, Rwanda (absent), the
Czech Republic, and Oman in July, 1994, when Resolution 940 authorizing force was
passed. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12.
121. See generally GOODRICH & HAmBRo, supra note 24, at 237-61.
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Chapter VI, in order to take action, the Council must find that the situation
is "likely to endanger" international peace and security. 122 Once the
Security Council finds that this threshold condition "in fact" exists, it may
take a variety of actions designed to peacefully resolve the dispute includ-
ing the recommendation of settlement procedures or specific terms for set-
tlement.1" 3 In this regard, the Security Council works closely with the
Secretary-General who often facilitates negotiations and may serve a medi-
ating or conciliatory role.124
The second set of U.N. options for dealing with an international crisis
falls under the general category of consensual, non-forcible intervention by
U.N. personnel."25 These options, which currently include traditional
peace-keeping forces,126 humanitarian relief,127 and transitional opera-
122. U.N. CHaRTER arts. 34, 37.
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 37(2). The Council is empowered, under Article 34, to con-
duct an investigation of any dispute which might lead to international friction. It has
frequently invoked this authority to send fact-finding missions comprised of experts
appointed by the Secretary-General or representatives of selected Council members. See,
e.g., S.C. Res. 619, U.N. SCOR, 43d Year, Res. & Dec. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/44 (1988)
(Iran-Iraq war); S.C. Res. 496, U.N. SCOR, 36th Year, Res. & Dec. at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/37 (1981) (Seychelles); S.C. Res. 319, U.N. SCOR, 27th Year, Res. & Dec. at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/28 (1972) (Namibia); S.C. Res. 295, U.N. SCOR, 26th Year, Res. & Dec. at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/27 (1971) (Guinea); S.C. Res. 39, U.N. SCOR, 3d Year, Res. & Dec. at
2-3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/REV.1(III) (1948) (Kashinr); Secretary-General Reports on
"Grave Situation" in Nagorno-Karabakh, U.N. CHRON., June 1992, at 37; New UN Mis-
sions: Ethnic Conflicts Draw UN Fact-Finding Efforts in Former Soviet Republic, U.N.
CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 39 (ethnic conflicts in former U.S.S.R.). See also G.A. Res. 46/59,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 290, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991).
124. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 718, U.N. SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 4142, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/47 (1991) (Cambodia); S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 4243,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991) (former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 621, U.N. SCOR, 43d Year,
Res. & Dec. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/44 (1988) (Western Sahara); S.C. Res. 377, U.N.
SCOR, 30th Year, Res. & Dec. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31 (1975) (Western Sahara); S.C.
Res. 367, U.N. SCOR, 30th Year, Res. & Dec. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31 (1975)
(Cyprus); S.C. Res. 319, supra note 123 (Namibia); S.C. Res. 309, U.N. SCOR, 27th Year,
Res. & Dec. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972) (Namibia). The General Assembly has also
frequently called upon the Secretary-General to conduct fact-finding and to lend assist-
ance in negotiating peaceful resolutions to international disputes, as it did in the case of
Haiti. E.g., G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 74; G.A. Res. 45/12, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49A, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1991). See also G.A. Res. 46/109A, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) (Central America);
G.A. Res. 35/37, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981)
(Afghanistan); G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 118, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1976).
125. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
126. Peace-keeping now comes in a variety of forms designed to fit the circumstances.
These range from observer missions, e.g., S.C. Res. 968, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, Res. &
Dec. at 121-22, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994) (Tajikistan); S.C. Res. 937, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Year, Res. & Dec. at 65-68, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994) (former Soviet Georgia), to
"peacemakers" authorized to defend populations with substantial force, e.g., S.C. Res.
998, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at , Doc. S/INF/. (1995) (to be published
in the Security Council Official Record); S.C. Res. 982, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. &
Dec. at __, U.N. Doc. S/INF/L (1995) (to be published in the Security Council Official
Record) (rapid reaction force in Bosnia). See Barbara Crossette, Security Council
Approves Additional Troops for Bosnia, N.Y. Tuims, June 16, 1995, at A12; see infra notes
131-32.
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tions,128 are neither directly authorized nor strictly contemplated by the
Charter.1 29 Rather, this type of U.N. conflict management activity evolved
in response to the Security Council paralysis created by the dueling cold
war vetoes of the United States and the former Soviet Union. 130 Because
these options are neither expressly authorized by the Charter nor imposed
in practice by the Security Council,' 31 they depend upon the negotiated
consent of the parties involved in the crisis. 13 2
127. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 117 (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 794, supra note 117 (Somalia);
S.C. Res. 688, supra note 117 (Iraqi Kurds).
128. See supra notes 31-38.
129. See Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the U.N. and Regional Organiza-
tions, in LAw AND FORCE supra note 15, at 65, 79-83. This lack of explicit Charter author-
ity caused former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjl61d to coin the now-famous
description of peace-keeping missions as having been authorized under "Chapter VI 1/
2." See Thomas G. Weiss, New Challenges for U.N. Military Operations: Implementing an
Agenda for Peace, 16 WASH. Q. 51, 52 (1993).
130. As of September 1992, there had been over 100 major conflicts which resulted in
279 vetoes in the Security Council. See UNrm NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; AN AGENDA
FOR PEACE PmVEamvE DIPLOMACY, PEACM AKING AND PEACE-KEEPING: REPORT OF THE SEC-
RETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO THE STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE SUMMIT MEETING OF THE
SECURITY CoUNCIL ON 31JANUARY 1992, U.N. Doc. S/2411-A/47/227 (1992) [hereinafter
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE]; The 38th Floor: An Agenda for Peace, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1992, at
4.
131. Such U.N. operations could be imposed by the Council under Chapter VII if the
Council so chooses. Somalia may be a lonely example of such action, although the
Secretary-General noted that there was no central government to give consent at the time
and the Council eventually negotiated the terms of the mission with the warring factions
prior to deployment. See S.C. Res. 794, supra note 117; UNrrED NATIONS, SECURITY COUN-
CIL; LETrER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE
PREsIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992). As noted below, how-
ever, Chapter VII-based operations require a finding that international peace has been
threatened or breached, whereas peace-keeping procedures do not strictly so require.
Moreover, as reflected by events in Somalia and Bosnia, the effectiveness of such opera-
tions depends upon the cooperation of the target states. Thus, being premised on the
consent of the parties, such peace-keeping activities are simply authorized by the Secur-
ity Council rather than imposed pursuant to Chapter VII. Circumstances in Bosnia and
Rwanda, however, have resulted in the authorization of forcible measures by the peace-
keepers, who are originally consensually deployed under Chapter VII, arguably trans-
forming those forces into "peacemakers." See S.C. Res. 998, supra note 126 (rapid reac-
tion force in Bosnia); S.C. Res. 929, supra note 117 (creation of safe zones in Rwanda);
S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992)
("all necessary means" to deliver aid in Bosnia); S.C. Res. 713, supra note 124 (no-fly
zone over Bosnia). See also S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 80-83,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 83-84,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) (force in Somalia); Craig R. Whitney, NATO Air Strikes in
Bosnia: A Catch-22, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1993, at AS.
132. N.B. Krylov, International Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions After the Cold
War, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 15, at 96; Schachter, supra note 129, at 67, 84-85.
See also Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 43, at 163-67. These opera-
tions, which, as of July 1995, involve approximately 70,000 U.N. personnel deployed in
about 16 different locations around the world, see Richard Bernstein, Sniping Is Growing
at the U.N. Over Weakness in Peacekeeping, N.Y. TnMES, June 21, 1993, at A6; Christopher
S. Wren, U.N. Chief Says Finances Hurt Its Role, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at A13, have
traditionally consisted of lightly-armed U.N. military personnel whose mandate is lim-
ited to that of an observer force serving as a buffer between warring factions. See, e.g.,
Schachter, supra note 129, at 84; Weiss, supra note 129, at 52-54. In 1992, the new
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated more aggressive use of U.N. troops
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As noted earlier, these consent-based options have become the princi-
pal mechanism in the U.N.'s recent efforts to promote democracy. 133 How-
ever, because the availability and effectiveness of these options depend
upon the consent of the defacto government and the requisite political will
to reach a solution, they are of limited utility when democracy is
usurped.134 In this context, such pre-conditions require negotiating with
coup leaders, tyrants and political elites regarding the deployment of U.N.
personnel and the terms of any resumption of democratic rule. As events
in Haiti demonstrate, the incentives for those who seize power through
unconstitutional means to submit to a process by which they will relin-
quish that power are limited.' 35 Consequently, creating transitional opera-
tions leading to democratic rule is not so much an enforcement tool for
restoring democracy as it is a method for achieving that goal once other
actions have made that resolution possible. Exactly what options the U.N.
may pursue to create such incentives remains the unresolved and critical
question.
The third and fourth sets of Security Council options are those author-
ized under Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII provides the only
source of international sanctions binding on all U.N. members. Under
Chapter VII, the Security Council may only order mandatory sanctions
against offending parties if it finds that the situation poses "any threat to
the peace," or if a "breach of the peace" or an "act of aggression" has
occurred.136
The Council's first option under Chapter VII provides a variety of non-
forcible sanctions authorized by Article 41. Available sanctions include
economic embargoes, disruption of travel or communication links, or other
measures which deprive the offending state of benefits associated with
membership in the international community.137 These non-forcible sanc-
tions may be combined with a limited use of force for enforcement pur-
poses.138 During the cold war, the Council sometimes recommended such
under the rubric of "peacemaking." AN AGENDA FOR PFACE, supra note 130. Escalating
events in Somalia and Bosnia have brought active use of force in uncontemplated ways
with unwelcome consequences. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Death Toll About 300 in
Oct. 3 U.S.-Somali Battle, N.Y. TImFs, Oct. 14, 1993, at A12; Whitney, supra note 131.
133. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
134. Events in Haiti amply demonstrate this point. Some states would undoubtedly
resist even such consensual transitional operations in the absence of international con-
flict on the basis that such action illegitimately interferes in domestic affairs. See supra
notes 45-50 and accompanying text. It is hard to understand, however, how consensual
involvement of the U.N., fully negotiated and agreed-to by both de facto and de jure
authorities, could constitute interference in violation of Article 2(7).
135. News reports indicate that the primary targets of such sanctions in Haiti, coup
leaders and supporters, experienced little change in lifestyle, and in some cases actually
profited from the sanctions, while the general population suffered greatly. See generally
supra note 96.
136. See U.N. CitaRTm art. 39.
137. See, e.g., infra notes 138-40. See generally FERENcz, supra note 113, at 471-77.
138. E.g., S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 29-32, U.N. Doc. 5/
INF/48 (1992) (authorizing "all necessary means" to enforce shipping embargo against
Serbia); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Res. & Dec. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
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measures to the member states but rarely invoked them as mandatory sanc-
tions. 139 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Security
Council has begun to impose Article 41 sanctions, particularly arms
embargoes, with increasing regularity. 140 Resolution 841, imposing the
economic embargo against Haiti, is one of the Council's most recent appli-
cations of Chapter VII sanctions. 141 With the arguable exceptions of South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia, 142 the economic sanctions imposed against
Haiti are also the only instance of such sanctions having been invoked
directly to counter a disruption of democratic rule.143
The Charter provides a fourth set of options, in the form of
mandatory, forcible measures, under Article 42.144 However, these options
may only be exercised if the Council finds that non-forcible measures are
or would be "inadequate."145 Article 42 empowers the Council to order a
(1990) (authorizing force to implement Res. 661 against Iraq). After the Security Coun-
cil resumed its embargo against Haiti in October 1993, it authorized such enforcement.
S.C. Res. 875, supra note 91.
139. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 180, U.N. SCOR, 18th Year, Res. & Dec. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/18/Rev.1 (1963) and S.C. Res. 312, U.N. SCOR, 27th Year, Res. & Dec. at 10-11,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972) (voluntary measures against Portugal for its colonial posses-
sions); S.C. Res. 283, U.N. SCOR, 25th Year, Res. & Dec. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25
(1970), S.C. Res. 558, U.N. SCOR, 39th Year, Res. & Dec. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/40
(1984) and S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th Year, Res. & Dec. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41
(1985) (voluntary diplomatic, trade and cultural embargo against South Africa). The
key phrase in most such hortatory resolutions is "calls upon" versus the mandatory lan-
guage "decides that all states shall." Between 1945 and 1992, the permanent five mem-
bers of the Security Council exercised their veto power 279 times, effectively eliminating
the possibility of using mandatory sanctions. See The 38th Floor: UN Agenda for Peace,
U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1992, at 4. The economic embargo against Southern Rhodesia in
1966 and arms embargo against South Africa in 1977 are two rare examples of
mandatory sanctions. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Year, Res. & Dec. at 7-9, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966), S.C. Res. 253, supra note 23, and S.C. Res. 277, U.N.
SCOR, 25th Year, Res. & Dec. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970) (Southern Rhodesia);
S.C. Res. 418, supra note 23 (South Africa). Since the end of the Cold War, the Council
has regularly invoked Article 41, particularly in the form of arms embargoes. See infra
note 140.
140. Recent examples include the arms and economic embargoes imposed against
parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, e.g., S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year,
Res. & Dec. at 7-11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) (freezing assets and seizing property);
S.C. Res. 787, supra note 138 (barring all maritime shipping to and from Serbia); S.C.
Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (ban-
ning all military flights over Bosnia); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res. & Dec. at
13-16, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (economic and air embargo against Serbia); S.C. Res.
713, supra note 124 (general arms embargo), and against Iraq after its invasion of
Kuwait, S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Res. & Dec. at 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990) (comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq). In 1992, the Council ordered
communication and travel restrictions against Libya, S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Year, Res. & Dec. at 52-55, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (air and arms embargoes), and
arms embargoes against Somalia and Liberia. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, Res.
& Dec. at 99-100, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (Liberia); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Year, Res. & Dec. at 55-56, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (Somalia).
141. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9.
142. See infra notes 187-88.
143. See infra notes 182-96 and accompanying text.
144. See U.N. CmaR art. 42.
145. Id.
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variety of forcible measures, including the introduction of land, sea and air
forces, so long as such measures are necessary to maintain or restore inter-
national peace.146
Historically, there are relatively few examples of Security Council
actibris under Chapter VII. Of these, arguably none clearly follows the con-
ditions set out by the Charter 147 or provides any guidance in the context of
disruptions of democracy.' 48 In any case, it is clear that the specific pow-
ers of the Security Council depend, at least formally, on the existence of a
threat to international peace. Indeed, the Security Council has never pur-
ported to act otherwise, although its recent pronouncements regarding the
existence of such threats are questionable. 149 Consequently, as explained
in Part IV, the U.N.'s future role in preserving or restoring democracy
depends, in large part, on the Security Council's political interpretation of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Coun-
cil's response to the coup in Haiti provides an important, though ambigu-
ous, precedent in that regard.
146. Recent example of Article 42 resolutions include the imposition of naval block-
ades and "no-fly" zones in the Balkans, S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec.
at 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) ("no-fly" zone); S.C. Res. 787, supra note 138 (naval
blockade); S.C. Res. 781, supra note 140 ("no-fly" zone), and the direct military actions
taken by coalition forces against Iraq in the 1990 Gulf War. E.g., S.C. Res. 678, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Year, Res. & Dec. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
147. Some have argued, for example, that the U.N. military response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait was not authorized either under Resolution 678 or Chapter VII. See, e.g.,
Childers, supra note 20, at 132; JohnJ. Quigley, The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder? 25 CoRNm.I. Irr'I. LJ. 1 (1992); Burns H.
Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making, 85 Am. J. Irr'L
L. 516 (1991). But see Oscar Schachter, United Nations in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452 (1991). These commentators suggest that the coalition forces, led by the
United States, exceeded the terms of Resolution 678, which did not authorize the coali-
tion's all-out bombing campaign but rather only the "necessary means" to return
Kuwait's sovereignty. E.g., Quigley, supra, at 5-10, 12, 19. Some have also suggested
that the action was ultra vires because the Council did not direct the military action but
rather abdicated authority and control to the United States. Id. at 23-28. U.S. manipula-
tion and control of the Council has also been suggested. See Roger Normand & Chris af
Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARv. INr'L
LJ. 387, 393 n.24 (1994); Weston, supra, at 525, 535. It is also arguable that the Secur-
ity Council failed to find that the Charter precondition for invoking Article 42, failure of
diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions, had occurred. E.g., Quigley, supra, at 20-23.
Similar critiques and ambiguities also cloud the precedential value of the Council's only
prior clear authorization of force, Korea. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Year, Res. & Dec.
at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.1 (1950). See Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by
the U.N. and Regional Organizations, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 15, at 66-75. Argua-
bly, the Security Council has consistently abdicated its role to the United States and its
allies. The Security Council is, however, the final arbiter of whether Chapter VII's pre-
conditions have been satisfied. See Case Concerning the Question of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lock-
erbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 LCJ. 114 [hereinafter Lockerbie]; infra notes 250-51, 255 and
accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 162, 166-72, 178, 187-88, 244-49, and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 160-213, 253-54 and accompanying text.
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IV. Evaluating the Implications of the United Nations Response to
Haiti-The Disruption of Democracy as a Threat to Peace
Until June, 1993, the U.N.'s response to the disruption of democracy in
Haiti centered tentatively on the first two Security Council options
described above: dispute resolution under Chapter VI of the Charter and
consensual peace-keeping efforts.' 50 However, on June 16, 1993, after
nearly two years of false starts, delay and obstinance by the military regime
in Haiti, the Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a partial
economic embargo.' 5 ' After another thirteen months of intransigence and
continued political oppression in Haiti,' 5 2 the Security Council took the
unprecedented step of authorizing member states to utilize force to restore
democracy in Haiti via Resolution 940.153
This response to the coup in Haiti raises many important questions
about the organization's future role in promoting, preserving and restoring
democracy and that role's relationship to international peace and secur-
ity. 15 4 For example, is the Council's decision to invoke mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions, and ultimately to authorize the use of force to restore
democratic government in Haiti sui generis or does it portend growing U.N.
authority to promote, preserve and restore democratic governance within
member states?15 5 If disruption of democracy by military coup justifies
Security Council enforcement orders, does the general denial of demo-
cratic rights by existing authoritarian regimes similarly justify collective
sanctions? Do less overt denials of democratic rights, such as have occured
in Africa's one-party states, or other subversions of democracy also justify
a collective U.N. response?
The answers to such complex questions depend on myriad factors,
both political and legal. The debate over such questions focuses mainly on
150. This effort at "pacific" dispute settlement was primarily confined to providing
limited (mostly moral) support for the OAS. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying
text. Although the General Assembly passed several resolutions urging voluntary com-
pliance with the OAS boycott, see, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 74; G.A. Res. 46/138,
supra note 71; G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 67, the Security Council took no action during
the first 15 months of the crisis other than to issue a non-binding statement through the
Council President condemning the coup and voicing support for the OAS. See supra
notes 61-66, 83-86 and accompanying text.
151. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9.
152. See supra notes 86-100.
153. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11.
154. The Security Council, Secretary-General and General Assembly have all recently
supported the general view that democracy, economic development and human rights
are all integral to maintaining international peace. See infra note 198. This recognition
does not, of course, answer the more critical and complex question: what action does
this relationship between peace and human rights justify given the current institutional
and normative development of the human rights system? See infra notes 176-211 and
accompanying text. See generally Donoho, supra note 22.
155. See infra notes 215-78 and accompanying text. Some Council members took
pains to limit the potentially precedential implications of their actions. See supra note
17; infra notes 230-31, 279. Professor Farer has perceptively noted that nearly all inter-
national law precedents can be "minced into their singular facts so that they end up
standing for nothing but themselves." Farer, supra note 113, at 185, 194.
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the potential justifications for the Security Council's actions and its inter-
pretation of the critical concept of "threat to peace" in a context which
implicates the still-evolving concepts of self-determination, democratic gov-
ernance and state sovereignty.' 5 6 Significantly, this debate comes at a time
of Security Council willingness to involve itself in humanitarian crises and
internal conflicts generally.' 5 7 As a result, the answers to such questions
also depend on growing doubts among many member states about the
institutional credibility of U.N. decision-making and fears of Western
domination.' 58
In accordance with the Charter, the Security Council justified impos-
ing mandatory sanctions against Haiti according to the vague proposition
that the "situation" posed a threat to international and regional "peace and
security."159 Evaluating the Council's actions first requires an examina-
tion of both its stated and its unstated reasons supporting this critical find-
ing. Whether the crisis in Haiti posed a threat to international peace
sufficient to justify mandatory sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 is at best
questionable. 160 In the first place, Haiti, a small island country with a
small, undisciplined military, had neither exhibited acts of external aggres-
sion nor otherwise threatened its neighbors.' 6 ' The coup itself resulted in
massive oppression but virtually no armed resistance which might have
spilled beyond Haiti's borders. 162 Further, while exiled, President Aristide
156. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 182-211, 237-61 and
accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 15, 117, 131; infra notes 166, 169-71, 178, 237.
158. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
159. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9. See also U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3413, supra note 12 (Council debate regarding Resolution 940); U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3238, supra note 17 (Council debate regarding Resolution 841).
160. A number of commentators have questioned whether the situation in Haiti actu-
ally posed a threat to peace. See e.g., HoFFMANN, supra note 15, at 21; Michael J. Glen-
non, Sovereignty and Community After Haiti: Rethinking Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 70, 72 (1995); Gordon, supra note 15, at 573; Kirkpatrick, supra note 113;
Krauthammer, supra note 118; A U.N. License to Invade Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994,
at A20. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12; UNITED NATIONS, SECURmTY CouN-
CIL; Lm-rm DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATrvE or CUBA TO THE
UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESImT OF THE SECURIrY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/
25942 (1993) [hereinafter LErrER FROM Cu&AN REFREsENTATIVE]. But see Farer supra note
1, at 726; W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of International Action, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 82, 82-83 (1995). Several Council members appeared to rely more on the
request for assistance from the Aristide government than on the existence of a credible
threat to peace. See infra note 233.
161. The Haitian military consists of about 7,000 minimally equipped, regular and
irregular personnel-a force sufficient to terrorize the populace, but hardly a direct
threat to Haiti's neighbors or regional stability. See Howard W. French, U.S. Move
Angers Diplomats In Haiti, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 14, 1993, at A8.
162. The existence of significant internal armed struggle with cross-border implica-
tions has been present in each civil conflict resulting in Security Council action in
recent years. Somalia may present an exception in that the internecine fighting which
plagued that country did not generally involve cross-border incursions at the time of
U.N. intervention. It did, however, have a recent history of such incursions and,
although not cited by the Security Council, clan fighting had imposed a significant refu-
gee population on Somalia's neighbors. See generally Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia:
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commanded no troops and had no immediate means to regain power
through the use of force. Finally, at least until the United States began
rattling its sabers in 1994, neither Aristide's foreign allies nor his support-
ers contemplated unilateral use of force which might have erupted into
international conflict. 163
Since the coup posed a threat of neither international nor domestic
military conflict, the only remaining rationales for finding a threat to peace
which would arguably justify mandatory sanctions were the humanitarian
and economic effects of the coup, and the putative relationship between
democracy and regional stability.164 Both the Security Council and the
General Assembly cited these factors with concern in their resolutions
regarding the Haitian coup.16 5
In terms of humanitarian and related economic factors, one could
argue that the economic disruption and flow of refugees caused by the
coup adversely affected Haiti's neighbors, thereby destabilizing the
region.166 However, the economic disruption argument lacks factual sup-
Failure of the Collective Response, in ENFORCING REsTRAINr, supra note 15, at 205-21 (over
one million refugees in 1992).
163. See supra note 94. Reports in late 1993 that the Clinton administration had not
foreclosed the option of armed intervention in Haiti caused a swift reaction from Capitol
Hill in the form of draft legislation purporting to limit the intervention of U.S. forces. See
Clinton Fights Attempt to Curb His Powers, M i HERALD, Oct. 19, 1993, at 10A; U.S. Not
Ruling Out the Use of Force, Envoy Says, Mmmi HERALD, Oct. 18, 1993, at 6A. The Clinton
administration almost immediately challenged the constitutionality of such legislation
as a usurpation of executive authority over foreign affairs and the President's powers as
Commander-in-Chief. See Clinton Fights Attempt to Curb His Powers, supra; Thomas L.
Friedman, Clinton Vows to Fight Congress on His Power to Use the Military, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1993, at Al. Arguably, even the threat of unilateral force in Haiti by the United
States would have violated the Charter, particularly since the Council had begun to act
on the matter. See U.N. CHARTR arts. 2(4), 51. See generally Romana Sadurska, Threats
of Force, 82 AM. J. Ibr'L L. 239 (1985). Compare Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-
Democratic Invasion, 78 Am. J. INVrr'L L. 645 (1984) and Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of
United States Intervention in Panama, 84 AM. J. Ir'L L. 494 (1990) with W. Michael
Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 74 AM. J.
LIrL L. 642 (1984). Whether the threat of unilateral force by the United States might
have justified the Security Council's own use of force raises an interesting question. Can
the United States or another interested power "manufacture" Security Council authority
by unilaterally threatening to take matters into its own hands thus creating a "threat to
peace?" Even if such a dubious justification for Security Council authority were consis-
tent with the Charter, it would expand the permanent Council member's already consid-
erable powers at the expense of non-Council states. See infra notes 237-66 and
accompanying text. This result may seem particularly problematic for non-Council
states since the Council has always delegated its Chapter VII enforcement tasks to the
United States and its allies. See infra note 261.
164. An alternative, if questionable, justification for sanctions could be the military
government's failure to meet its obligations under the Governor's Island Agreement. See
supra notes 88-90. Although the Council cites this breach with disapproval, there is
nothing else in the Resolutions, Council debate or prior U.N. practice to suggest that
such a breach is itself grounds for Chapter VII measures. See supra notes 114, 136-49.
165. See G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 74; G.A. Res. 46/138, supra note 71; S.C. Res.
940, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9.
166. The "external" effects of internal conflicts, in the form of refugee flows and dis-
placed populations, characterized all of the Council's recent ventures into humanitarian
intervention (except, perhaps, Somalia). E.g., S.C. Res. 929, supra note 117 (safe havens
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port. For example, no evidence suggests that the coup itself, rather than
U.N.-imposed sanctions, resulted in economic conditions which might
have threatened regional peace.' 6 7
The destabilizing impact of refugees has more credibility as a potential
threat to peace. The U.N. has recognized that massive flows of refugees are
a serious worldwide problem with potentially deleterious effects on inter-
national peace.' 68 Indeed, the Security Council premised, at least in part,
the rationale for protection of Iraqi Kurds16 9 and the creation of safe zones
in the Balkans' 70 and Rwanda' 7 1 on the regional consequences of massive
for refugees caused by genocidal massacres in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Year, Res. & Dec. at 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); S.C. Res. 688, supra note 117
(Council cites repression of Kurds and resulting refugee flows as threats to peace);
UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY CouNcI PROVIsIONAL VERBATIM REcORD OF THE Two THou-
sAND NINE HuNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEM-NG, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982 (1991) (refugees
primary subject of debate over Resolution 688). Although Resolutions concerning
Somalia cite general humanitarian concerns as justification for finding a threat to peace,
e.g., S.C. Res. 794, supra note 117; see also S.C. Res. 837, supra note 131 (authorizing
capture and prosecution of those responsible for attacks on U.N. peace-keepers in
Somalia), the situation in Somalia also involved over one million Somali refugees. See
Clark, supra note 162, at 213.
167. There would be, in any case, an ironic inconsistency in relying upon economic
disruption as a justification for imposing economic sanctions under Chapter VII. The
coup leaders and some commentators may have recognized this point, arguing that U.N.
economic sanctions vere the real cause of hardship suffered by the Haitian people.
Howard W. French, Plight of Haiti's Poor Brings Calls to Loosen the Embargo, N.Y. TwEs,
Aug. 5, 1992, at A23; Howard W. French, Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000
Children a Month, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 9, 1993, at Al. See Carothers, Empirical Perspectives
on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, supra note 2, at 266; Monroe
Leigh, The Political Consequences of Economic Embargoes, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1995);
Schnably, supra note 70, at 489-95.
168. See G.A. Res. 49/174, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 191, U.N. Doc. A/
49/49 (1994) (emphasizing the seriousness of massive refugee flows); G.A. Res. 48/118,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 234, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993); G.A. Res. 46/
127, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 198, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991). See
generally UNrrTD NATIONS, GENRAL ASSEMBLY; ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SEcRETARY-GENEnAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/578
(1994) [hereinafter SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON REFUGEES]; Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/12
(1994) [hereinafter UNHCR Report]. See infra notes 175-78.
169. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 117. In fact, the Council itself neither authorized forci-
ble action to protect the Kurds nor created Kurdish "safe zones." Rather, Resolution 688
merely demanded that Iraq cease its repression of the Kurds and allow international
humanitarian assistance. Id. Nevertheless, Britain, France, and the United States inter-
preted Resolution 688 "liberally" to justify their joint creation of safe havens for Kurds in
Iraq as a part of the Gulf War aftermath. See MALANczUtc, supra note 15, at 17-19;
Schachter, supra note 147, at 468; Jane E. Stromseth, Self-Determination, Sucession and
Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations, 86 AM. So'v INT'L L. PROC. 369, 373
(1992). Some have suggested that the safe zones were in fact unauthorized, unilateral
actions by these states constituting a fundamental breach of Iraq's sovereignty. See
MALANCZUK, supra note 15, at 19 (citing an article by Eric Suy, the Secretary-General's
Personal Representative, who ultimately negotiated Iraq's consent to U.N. protection of
the Kurds).
170. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 166 (authorizing force to protect safe areas); S.C. Res.
824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 11-13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) (safe
zones in Tuzla, Goradze, Bihac, Sarajevo and Zepa); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year,
Res. & Dec. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) (establishes Srebrenica safe zones); S.C.
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refugee flows. Similarly, in the case of Haiti, Security Council resolutions
cite concern over refugees and their "negative repercussions" on the
region. 172
However, even the most sanguine supporters of aggressive U.N. action
should find the refugee argument regarding Haiti less than compelling.
The United States, for example, actively reduced the flow of refugees at sea
to pre-coup levels by pursuing its aggressive (and probably illegal) 173
interdiction program. 174 The Haitian refugee population resulting from
the coup, although tragic, is minor compared with other refugee popula-
tions around the world.175 Although massive refugee flows alone have
Res. 770, supra note 131 (authorizing "all measures necessary" to facilitate humanita-
rian assistance in the former Yugoslavia).
171. S.C. Res. 929, supra note 117, and S.C. Res. 918, supra note 117 (use of force to
create and protect safe zones in Rwanda). See S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res.
& Dec. at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/ (1995) (to be published in the Security Council
Official Record); G.A. Res. 49/23, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/49/49 (1994).
172. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9. The creation of refu-
gees was, however, only cited as a justification for sanctions by two Council members
during the debate over Resolution 841. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17, at 7 (Can-
ada), 11 (Venezuela). Nor did refugees play a significant role in the Council debate
regarding Resolution 940. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12. See G.A. Res. 47/20,
supra note 74; G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 67.
173. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the interdiction program as a matter of U.S. law
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). The U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other commentators have sharply criticized the
Court's opinion. See 32 I.L.M. 1215 (1993) (June 22, 1993 Statement of High Commis-
sioner); Thomas David Jones, Case Note, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 114 (1994); Case Note, 17
Fo.DHm INT'L UJ. 1062 (1994); Notes from the President, ASIL NEWSLETTER (Am. Soc'y
Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 1.
174. 1993 SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON HAm, supra note 74, at 15 (reporting 38,315 "boat
people" intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard between October 1991 and July 1992);
Barbara Crossette, Haiti Detains 150 Returned by the U.S., N.Y. TMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at
A3. Approximately 70,000 Haitian refugees were picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast
Guard between 1991 and 1994. Haiti: Returning Refugees Slam Internment Camps, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File. The U.S. had
received similar waves of Haitian refugees throughout the prior two decades, including
50,000 Haitian refugees in 1980-82. See, e.g., Caroline R. Herron & Michael Wright,
The Nation in Summary: Watch at Sea for Haitians, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1981, at 2; Jeffrey
E. Stoll, For the Haitians, Symbol of Hope, N.Y. Tncms, July 25, 1982, at 1; Stuart Taylor,
Jr., Deciding How to Stop Haitians-And Why, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1981, at 4. In April
1994, President Aristide formally renounced the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Interdiction Agreement
(giving the required six month's notice). See Haiti Won't Renew Repatriation Pact with
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at A10. A month later, the Clinton administration
reversed its policy of summarily repatriating Haitians promising instead to provide all
refugees with an asylum hearing. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings at
Sea, N.Y. Tnimas, May 8 1994, at 1. After nearly 20,000 Haitians fled during June and July
1994, Susan Benesch, Island Camp Deters Flight of Haitians, Mi mi HERALD, July 16,
1994, at 20A, the administration again reversed itself causing a dramatic drop in the
refugee flow. See Larry Rohter, Number of Haitians Fleeing by Sea Drops Off Abruptly,
N.Y. Tni _s, July 20, 1994, at A3.
175. The UNHRC has reported that over 23 million people, including 16.4 million
refugees, are in need of its care worldwide. UNHRC Report, supra note 168, at 1. The
Secretary-General estimates that there are 7.2 million refugees and 20 million displaced
persons in Africa alone. SEc.-GEN. REPORT ON REFUGEES, supra note 168, at 2. G.A. Res.
47/107, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). There
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resulted in significant humanitarian relief efforts by the U.N., 176 they have
not historically been viewed by the international community as a sufficient
threat to peace to justify mandatory collective security measures. 177
Recent Security Council Resolutions in Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda do cite
concern over refugees, however, other factors figure more prominently in
eliciting international concern. 1 78 In any case, each situation also involved
massive numbers of refugees which dwarf the Haitian flow. 179 Moreover, if
are also numerous recent examples of massive refugee flows to which the Council has
had little or no reaction. For example, over 400,000 refugees from Burundi remain in
neighboring states. UNHCR Report, supra note 168, at 19. Some 250,000 Burmese eth-
nic minorities have fled government oppression in Myanmar, which has also exper-
ienced a recent disruption of democracy much like the coup in Haiti. UNITED NATIONS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS; REPORT ON THE SrruA-
TION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR, PREPARED BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, MR. Yozo
YOKOTA, IN ACCORDANCE wrTH COMMISSION RESOLUTION 1994/85, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1995/65 (1995); Massive Emergencies, Large-Scale Repatriations Confront UNHCR,
U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 88. Approximately 250,000 Armenian refugees and 658,000
displaced persons have resulted from the civil war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Id. at 88.
The continuing conflict in Afghanistan has forced as many as 4 million people back and
forth across the border into Pakistan and Iran. See UNHCR Report, supra note 168, at
33; U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982, supra note 166, at 10. Civil war in Sudan has caused 1.7
million displaced persons and at least 100,000 refugees. Sudan: Envoy Appointed, U.N.
CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 24. None of these enormous refugee flows has resulted in the
imposition of Chapter VII sanctions even though they dwarf the refugee flow created by
the coup in Haiti. Finally, civil war in Liberia has resulted in the displacement of over
half the population and up to 700,000 international refugees. See David Wippman,
Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING REnTAINT, supra
note 15, at 156, 163. It has also involved regional confrontations and -the intervention of
foreign troops under the auspices of a West African regional organization. Id. Neverthe-
less, the Security Council has declined the request of African states to impose a
mandatory economic embargo in favor of a more limited arms embargo. S.C. Res. 788,
supra note 140.
176. See G.A. Res. 49/174, supra note 168. See generally UNHCR Report, supra note
168.
177. See supra note 175.
178. In justification of mandatory collective measures taken in Iraq, Bosnia and
Rwanda, the Security Council has cited refugee flows as one justification for finding the
prerequisite threat to international peace. See supra notes 169-71. The Council's refer-
ences to refugee flows and displaced populations in these resolutions suggest a new
prominence for this phenomenon in Security Council efforts to preserve international
peace. However, this argument is implausible in the context of Haiti. First, in each of
the above situations factors other than refugee flows played prominent roles in the
Council's decision-making. For example, Iraqi treatment of the Kurds must be viewed in
light of the overall Gulf conflict. Moreover, Resolution 688 merely demanded that Iraq
cease its repression; it did not in fact authorize a collective response. See supra note 169.
Bosnia involves a significant international military confrontation which clearly threatens
regional peace. It also has displaced over 2 million civilians and has involved gross
human rights violations. Rvanda has involved both civil war and genocide.
179. In each situation, the number of refugees involved (1.5 million Kurds, 1.25 mil-
lion Rwandans and 4 million displaced or besieged former Yugoslavians, see Massive
Emergencies, Large-Scale Repatriations Confront UNHCR, supra note 175; UNHCR
Report, supra note 168, at 29-30) dwarfs the Haitian refugee flow. See supra notes 166,
173-75. The Haitian refugee crisis, however, had a disproportionately large political
impact as it directly affected the interests of the United States, a factor which translated
into the political will to act at the Security Council. See infra notes 256-66 and accompa-
nying text.
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mandatory collective security measures were justified against Haiti merely
by virtue of the coup's creation of refugees, then consistency would require
Chapter VII sanctions in dozens of other situations posing far more mas-
sive and destabilizing refugee crises.180 Indeed, refugee flows and dis-
placed populations are a ubiquitous feature of virtually all significant civil
conflicts.
Nor can Haiti's situation be distinguished from other civil conflicts
because of the severity of the military's human rights record. Although
terrible, the human rights abuses experienced by Haitians fail to distin-
guish Haiti from dozens of other troubled states that have not been consid-
ered as targets for Security Council intervention.' 81 Under these
circumstances, justification for Chapter VII action in Haiti is questionable.
The remaining rationale to justify the Council's imposition of
mandatory sanctions is that the disruption of democracy in Haiti, at least
when combined with the flow of refugees, itself constituted the prerequisite
threat to international peace and security. 182 Although not articulated by
the Council, the central premise of this argument is that democratic gov-
ernance is directly and causally linked to international peace. 183 The argu-
ment proceeds from the premise that the existence of democratic
180. See supra note 175. Potential despots beware: close the borders before seizing
control of the state.
181. Some obvious examples of states guilty of human rights abuses similar to Haiti
would include Myanmar, Indonesia (East Timor), Nigeria, Iran, Kenya, Sudan and China
(Tibet). See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/514 (1994)
(Iran); G.A. Res. 49/197, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/49/
49 (1994) (Myannar); G.A. Res. 48/147, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 267,
U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (Sudan); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, supra note 175; UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTs; SITUATION IN
EAST TIMOR: REPORT OF THE SECRETRY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/61 (1994);
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; SITUA-
TION IN TIBET: NoTE BY THE SECRETRY-GENERAL SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SUB-COMMISSION
ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES RESOLUTION 1991/10,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/37 (1992). Similarly, these countries' human rights abuses
pale in comparison to the atrocities which prompted Council action in Rwanda and
Bosnia. Similar abuses failed to prompt action in Biafra (1967), Bangladesh (1971),
Kampuchea (1975-79), and Uganda (1970s). See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia,
23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Timor and
the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 2 (1980).
182. Although Resolution 841 makes no explicit reference to democracy, its text con-
tains many indirect references and the Council debate focused on the disruption of
democracy as an important, if not central, justification for its action. See U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3238, supra note 17. Resolution 940 states that the "goal of the international com-
munity remains the restoration of democracy in Haiti." S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11.
Council debate similarly focused on the restoration of democratic rule. See U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3413, supranote 12.
183. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text. The Clinton Administration's
Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, recently articulated this justification for the
intervention in Haiti. See Jonathan Power, Democracy Is the Pathway to Peace, BALT. SUN,
Oct. 28, 1994, at A19. Christopher Marquis, Haiti Agrees To International Observer
Force, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 10, 1993, at 14A.
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governments directly contributes to peaceful international relations and
global stability.' 84 Thus, the disruption of an established democracy con-
stitutes a threat to international stability.' 85 Similarly, such disruptions, if
left unanswered, threaten the global trend toward democratization, which
in turn inhibits the prospects for international peace. Hence, the U.N.'s
failure to aggressively respond to the coup in Haiti would have emboldened
potential putschists, thereby increasing the threat to weak governments
particularly, and the international order generally.- 86
Historically, U.N. practice offers little support for the proposition that
the disruption of democracy creates a threat to peace justifying U.N.
action. With the possible exception of the ambiguous precedents set in
Southern Rhodesia' 87 and South Africa,' 88 the U.N. and the international
184. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 197-202. See generally Donoho, supra note 22.
186. See, e.g., Douglas W. Payne, Human Rights vs. Aspiring Autocrats, WASH. PosT,
June 2, 1993, at A19. The newly democratized states of the OAS have articulated this
rationale for collective action in defense of democracy (and their own preservation) pur-
suant to the Santiago Declaration. See supra note 69. See generally Farer, supra note 1, at
734; Claudio Grossman, Remarks, 86 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 257, 259 (1992); Schn-
ably, supra note 70, at 517; Dinah Shelton, Representative Democracy and Human Rights
in the Western Hemisphere, 12 HuM. RTS. LJ. 353 (1991).
187. In 1968, the Security Council responded to the 1966 rebellion in Southern Rho-
desia by imposing mandatory economic sanctions. S.C. Res. 277, supra note 139; S.C.
Res. 253, supra note 23; S.C. Res. 232, supra note 139. See RESOLUnONS AND STATEmENTS,
supra note 66, at 78-80. The Council also authorized a limited use of force to stop oil
tankers from violating the embargo. See S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Year, Res. &
Dec. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966). These Chapter VII sanctions appeared to
be premised primarily on the denial of the black majority's rights to political participa-
tion and self-determination. See id.; S.C. Res. 217, U.N. SCOR, 20th Year, Res. & Dec. at
8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.1 (1965). See also G.A. Res. 2022(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th
Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). See generally Myres S. McDougal
& W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International
Concerns, 62 AM. J. INV'L L. 1 (1968). In this sense, the situation in Southern Rhodesia is
probably the precedent most relevant to Haiti. See Reisman, supra note 160, at 83. The
situation in Southern Rhodesia, however, may be distinguished. First, there were both
continuing allegations of armed aggression by the white minority government against its
neighbors and an armed black resistance prone to cross-border incursions. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 411, U.N. SCOR, 32d Year, Res. & Dec. at 9-11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
Moreover, the white Rhodesians' seizure of power directly impeded an ongoing U.N.
effort to decolonize that country. It also involved systematic racial discrimination, a
human rights violation of special importance and concern under international law and
U.N. practice. These factors also naturally incensed Southern Rhodesia's black African
neighbor states who actively assisted black Rhodesian resistance forces and threatened
to use force directly. See Sydney D. Bailey, The Security Council, in THE UNrT NATIONS
AND HumAN RIGHTs: A CiuricAL APPRAISAL 304, 307-10 (P. Alston ed., 1992). Southern
Rhodesia may also be viewed as having involved a question of statehood rather than one
of the legitimacy of its government. See RESTATEMNT (THmi) OF U.S. FOEIGN RELATIONS
LAv § 202, note 5 (1986).
188. In that apartheid in South Africa involved a denial of basic democratic rights for
black South Africans, there are clear parallels between Security Council actions in Haiti
and South Africa. The Council imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1977 for,
among other things, its violent repression of the "African people in Soweto and other
areas of South Africa" and its continued imposition of Apartheid in defiance of Security
Council resolutions. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 23. See Bailey, supra note 187, at 312-13.
The imposition of sanctions against South Africa, however, represents an ambiguous
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community in general have typically responded to unconstitutional
seizures of power sporadically and based solely on political considera-
tions. 189 Indeed, between 1945 and 1995 there have been dozens of coups
in which governments of U.N. member states have changed hands in con-
travention of established constitutional processes. Although the Security
Council and the General Assembly have at times condemned such illegal
usurpations of power, 190 each of these undemocratic regimes (with the
precedent for Haiti for reasons similar to those relating to Southern Rhodesia. Resolu-
tion 418, for example, prominently cites a "military build-up by South Africa and its
persistent acts of aggression against the neighboring States." G.A. Res. 2508(XXIV),
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); S.C. Res. 418,
supra note 23. See U.N. SCOR, 32d Year, 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2046 (1977);
REsoLuTrIoNs AND STArmaNrs, supra note 66, at 156, 171-72. At least in part, the sanc-
tions also reflected condemnation for South Africa's occupation of South West Africa
(now Namibia). See id. at 196-98; S.C. Res. 301, U.N. SCOR, 26th Year, Res. & Dec. at 7-
8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27 (1971); S.C. Res. 269, U.N. SCOR, 24th Year, Res. & Dec. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1969). Because of its racial policies, the South African gov-
ernment was a pariah state which threatened its neighbors with an aggressive military
force prone to cross-border incursions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 428, U.N. SCOR, 33d Year,
Res. & Dec. at 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978); S.C. Res. 387, U.N. SCOR, 31st Year,
Res. & Dec. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976). Under these circumstances it is diffi-
cult to determine what role the denial of demo~cratic rights may have played in the Coun-
cil's limited invocation of Chapter VII. Council resolutions, however, imply that the
denial of self-determination inherent in apartheid constituted a threat to peace. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 473, U.N. SCOR, 35th Year, Res. & Dec. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980);
S.C. Res. 191, U.N. SCOR, 19th Year, Res. & Dec. at 13-15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev.1
(1964); S.C. Res. 181, U.N. SCOR, 18th Year, Res. & Dec. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/18/
Rev.1 (1963); S.C. Res. 134, U.N. SCOR, 15th Year, Res. & Dec. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
15/Rev.1 (1960). But see U.N. SCOR, 18th Year, 1056th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1056
(1963) (U.S. objections that South Africa posed no threat to peace appropriate for Chap-
ter VII actions).
189. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Igor 1. Lukashuk, The United Nations and
Illegitimate Regimes: When to Intervene to Protect Human Rights, in LAw AD FoRcE, supra
note 15, at 142, 152; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 86 AM. Soc'y IT'L L. PROC. 249, 249-50 (1992). See generally REsTATEmENT (THRD)
OF U.S. FOREGN RaATonNs LAw § 203 cmt. e (1986) ("International law does not gener-
ally address domestic constitutional issues such as how a national government is
formed."); JOHN DuGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UnriE NATIONS (1987) (focusing on the
fact that recognition of statehood and of governments is primarily an issue of "domestic
politics"); Louis HENImN Er AL., INERNATioNAL. LAw 260-85 (3d ed. 1993). Most states
have treated the issue of recognition of a new government in terms of de facto control
and political expediency. See, e.g., HErNN Er AL., supra, at 261-67. The OAS, which has
seen a dramatic resurgence of democratic governments since the late 1980s, recently
made moves to recognize the preservation of democratic order as a fundamental aspect
of governmental legitimacy. See supra note 69. A similar change in the traditional rules
on recognition of statehood, as distinguished from recognition of governments, seems to
be occurring in Europe and among CSCE member states. See generally HENKIN Er AL.,
supra, at 251-53; Halberstam, supra note 1.
190. The U.N. has on occasion deemed certain governments illegitimate although spe-
cial political considerations have usually motivated such condemnation. For example,
U.N. institutions declared governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia illegal.
See G.A. Res. 34/93G, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980) (refusing to recognize the Bantustan states created by South Africa); G.A. Res.
3206(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
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exceptions of South Africa and South Rhodesia) 191 was eventually accepted
by the U.N. as the legitimate representative of its state.19 2 Indeed, neither
legal pedigree nor democratic governance is a prerequisite to U.N. member-
ship.193 Nearly half of the governments in the organization remain decid-
edly undemocratic.1 9 4 More importantly for present purposes, the
Council has simply not responded to coups under Chapter VII.' 9 5 This
reluctance to intervene has been manifested regardless of whether the
seizure of power usurped an established democratic order, resulted in eco-
nomic disruption and political oppression or caused significant refugee
flows.'19 6
One could argue that the U.N.'s failure to respond to prior disruptions
of democratic rule should be dismissed as a historical relic. Democracy,
political participation rights and the concept of internal self-determina-
(rejecting the South African delegation's credentials); G.A. Res. 2024(XX), U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (declaring Ian Smith's white
minority government in S. Rhodesia illegal); S.C. Res. 217, supra note 187 (Southern
Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Year, Res. & Dec. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/
Rev.1 (1965) (Southern Rhodesia); supra notes 187-88.
191. See supra notes 187-88.
192. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/150, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 270, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (urging democracy in Myanmar but dearly recognizing the de
facto authority of the military government which ignored 1990 elections); Participation
and Representation of Democratic Kampuchea in UN Bodies, 1986 U.N.Y.B. 208; Bernard
D. Nossiter, U.N. Assembly, Rebuffing Soviet, Seats Cambodia Regime of Pol Pot, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1979, at Al. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/55, supra note 60, at 30-
31. Early in the U.N.'s history, the Secretary-General disavowed any power for collective
recognition of either states or governments by the organization. UNITED NATIONS, SECUR-
Try COUNCIL; LETTER DATED 8 MARCH 1950 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURrIY
COUNCIL FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, TRANSMITING A MEMORANDUM ON THE LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. S/1466
(1950).
193. The only requirement for U.N. membership is that the State be "peace loving"
and capable of meeting its Charter obligations. U.N. CHARTR art. 4; Conditions of
Admission of A State to Membership in the U.N., 1948 I.CJ. 57, 62.
194. Estimates regarding the number of democratic states worldwide vary considera-
bly depending upon the criteria utilized. A 1993-94 Freedom House survey of "freedom
in the world" found that of 190 independent nations there were 108 "democracies" at
the end of 1993. Adrian Karatnycky, The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1993-1994:
Freedom in Retreat, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1993-94, at 3, 4-5 (1994). See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD
WAVE 3-26 (1991) (describing trends of global democratization). Many of these states,
however, would not be considered genuine democracies by Western standards. See, e.g.,
Meisler, supra note 2; Nicole Watts, Turkey's Kurdish Conundrum, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24,
1995, at 5 (citing serious flaws in Turkey's democracy). That authoritarian states fre-
quently hold elections hardly qualifies them as democratic. See, e.g., Scott Kraft, Iraqis
to Vote on Hussein, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 1995, at 6A (Iraq); id. at 3A (Egypt). Indeed,
Freedom House also found only 72 of these 108 democracies were fully "free." Only
19% of the world's population enjoy full civil and political freedoms. Karatnycky, supra,
at 3-4.
195. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text; infra notes 194, 205-13.
196. Even since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has typically failed to
respond to military coups, including those which disrupted established or fledgling
democracies, as occurred in Panama (1989), Myanmar (Burma) (1990), Thailand
(1991), Peru (1992), Algeria (1992) Nigeria (1993), Sierra Leone (1992), Suriname
(1990), Guatemala (1993), and the Gambia (1994). See infra notes 217-25.
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tion' 97 have gained increased stature in international law during recent
years. International organizations, bureaucrats and states now commonly
link the maintenance of peaceful international relations to the existence of
democratic regimes and to the protection of human rights.198 Commenta-
tors also show considerable support for this proposition. 199 Although the
empirical evidence supporting the putative relationship between peace and
democracy is hazy at best,20 0 its intuitive appeal to liberal democracies is
powerful. 201 Furthermore, the U.N. has increasingly allocated resources
and energy to the pursuit of democratization. 2°2
Nevertheless, there is widespread dissent from the idea that threats to
197. Many states would confine the principle of self-determination to the right of
"peoples" (as embodied by the state) to be free from outside interference, traditionally in
the form of colonization. E.g., Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, at 124;
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). See
generally HuRsT HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DET EMINATION 30-49, 113-
17, 467 (1990); HE-MIN Er At-, supra note 189, at 302-08. There is some evidence, how-
ever, that the concept of "internal" self-determination, in the form of rights associated
with popular sovereignty, is gaining acceptance. See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination
in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 734, 752-56
(1995). The notion that people or groups within the state have a right to "internal" self-
determination continues to meet strong resistance because it tends to support secession-
ist movements. See id. at 733, 737-40. See also Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determi-
nation: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 177, 181-85 (1991).
198. See U.N. Doc. A/47/1, supra note 2, at I 9, 58, 67, 81, 101, 103, 109, 166, 168;
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 130, Hcl 5, 15; UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL;
NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992); Security
Council Summit Declaration: 'New Risks for Stability and Security', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1992, at A4. See also UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; LErTm DArED 22 NOVEmBER
1994 FROM THE PERmANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NICARAGUA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRE'ARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/49/713 (1994); G.A. Res. 46/118,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) ("recalling"
Secretary-General's statement that "human rights [have become] one of the keystones in
the arch of peace"); Central America: Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Develop-
ment, G.A. Res. 46/109B, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/46/
49 (1991) ("reaffirming the belief that peace is one, undivided and indivisible, and thus
inseparable from freedom, democracy and development" and encouraging initiatives
which "consolidate governments which genuinely represent the will of the people"); SAN-
TIAGo DECLARATION, supra note 69; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,
reprinted in 29 LL.M. 1305, 1307 (1990); Donoho, supra note 22, at 827-29; Farer, supra
note 1, at 721-23, 727-35; Historic Security Council Session Reaffirms Committment To
Collective Security, U.N. CHRoN., June 1992, at 4-5; The 49th Session: Looking Towards
The U.N. of the Future, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 58.
199. See, e.g., Farer, supra note 1, at 725; Franck, supra note 1; Gassama, supra note 1,
at 307, 330; Grossman, supra note 186, at 259; Halberstam, supra note 1, at 168; Reis-
man, supra note 1; Shelton, supra note 186.
200. See, e.g., Steve Chan, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More
Pacific?, 28 J. CoNFLIcT RESOL 617 (1984) (reviewing various studies); Donoho, supra
note 22, at 828; Farer, supra note 1, at 724-25; Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: Tle
Myth of the Democratic Peace, 19 IN'L SECURITY 5 (1994).
201. See Farer, supra note 1, at 724-25 (noting strong "deductive proof").
202. 1994 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note 26; 1993 REPORT ON ELECTIONS, supra note
26; G.A. Res. 49/190, supra note 51. See supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
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democracy alone can justify collective action under the Charter. 20 3 Many
states insist that change in government is a domestic matter beyond the
authority of international law.20 4 Some states still cling to the proposition
that enforcement of democratic rights is outside U.N. authority. 205 These
states have insisted that even relatively innocuous U.N. activities, such as
promoting the emerging right to democratic governance through electoral
assistance, 20 6 should be limited and must be undertaken strictly pursuant
to the consent of the parties involved.20 7 Even when consensual, such
activities have nevertheless caused renewed debate over state sovereignty
and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. 208 Furthermore,
while the U.N. and the international community have lent some credibility
and substance to internationally protected democratic rights,20 9 there is no
consensus regarding the definition of, or minimum criteria for, "genuine"
democracy. 210 Indeed, the General Assembly has continually emphasized
its toleration of wide diversity in states' choices of political systems.21' In
essence, until the coup in Haiti, the international community had not
agreed that the disruption of democracy constituted a threat to interna-
tional peace.
Did the imposition of Chapter VII sanctions against Haiti signify a
change in this attitude? One potential implication of the Security Coun-
cil's action is that it did, at least when the denial of democracy was coupled
203. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/46/616, supra note 50, at 5, 9 (statements supporting right
to choose own political system); U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12, at 5 (Cuba), 10
(China), 4 (Mexico), 6 (Uruguay), 8 (Venezuela and Brazil); U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra
note 17, at 15 (Comments of Pakistani representative), 20 (China); LE=TE FROM CUBAN
REPRSENTATnvE, supra note 160; Richard D. Lyons, Latin Nations At U.N. Delay Resolu-
tion On Haiti Invasion, N.Y. TMEs, July 31, 1994, at 10; supra notes 50-54, 64-65; infra
notes 237, 249. See also HoFFmlA, supra note 15, at 32-34 (citing hostility to Council's
apparent broadening of the definition of threats to peace); Caron, supra note 15, at 552-
53 (citing hostility to Council's apparent broadening of the definition of threats to
peace); Farer, supra note 1, at 721-22; Stromseth, supra note 169, at 372.
204. See supra notes 48-54, 64-65, 189; infra notes 237-38.
205. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17, at 20 (China); LErr= FROM CUBAN REP-
REENA-TvE, supra note 160 (Cuba); supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. See also
HAmuM, supra note 197, at 113-17, 467; Stromseth, supra note 169, at 372.
206. See supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. See also David J. Scheffer, The
Expanding U.N. Role in Humanitarian Relief Operations, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 313,
317 (1992) (developing states stress need for state consent in the delivery of any human-
itarian aid; resist "gifts by coercion").
208. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. But see Fox, supra note 197, at
775-76, 779 (arguing that sovereignty objections to election monitoring are "waning").
209. Franck, supra note 1, at 74-77; Reisman, supra note 26, at 7. In particular, rules
regarding "free and fair" elections have undergone significant development. See id. at 4-
9, 22-24; Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 86 AM.
Soc'Y Iwr'L L. PROC. 249, 251-52 (1992).
210. See Donoho, supra note 22, at 840-43; Carothers, Democracy Promotion Under
Clinton, supra note 2, at 13-17; Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the
Use of Force, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 113, 144 (1986); Schnably, supra note 70, at 516-26,
531-44.
211. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. At the same time, the General
Assembly has affirmed that the "will of the people" expressed in periodic genuine elec-
tions is the basis for a government's "authority." See G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 28.
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with other "internationalizing" factors.212 The intersection between
human rights, democracy and international peace, while still in the early
stages of evolution, was clearly brought to the forefront by the disruption
of democracy in Haiti. This is particularly true in that the international
community actively sponsored Haiti's initial transition to democracy. 213
Moreover, apart from the factually weak justification regarding refugees, 2 14
the potential threat to peace caused by the disruption of democracy in
Haiti appears to be the central justification for the Security Council's sanc-
tions against the coup. Thus, the Council's decision to impose Chapter VII
sanctions arguably may have established a revolutionary and, undoubtedly
to some, dangerous precedent in this regard.
As set forth in Part V, however, a number of important political and
institutional realities raise serious doubts as to the depth of the Security
Council's commitment to democracy. These realities and other Security
Council decision-making issues will probably render Haiti a case of limited
precedential value.
V. Future United Nations Actions to Restore Democracy After Haiti-
Institutional and Political Impediments to Collective Action
There are, among other reasons, four related factors which probably will
limit the Haitian precedent and inhibit U.N. actions to restore democracy.
These factors, while sobering, should not lead to dire pessimism, however.
They also highlight institutional reforms which might increase the interna-
tional community's willingness to use sanctions or other collective actions
to restore, promote or preserve democracy in the future.
The first factor is that even the exceptional use of collective measures
to counter disruptions of democracy is politically untenable given the cur-
rent makeup of the U.N. membership. Although the current wave of
democratization has wrought important changes in the existing world
order,215 the U.N.'s membership remains decidedly undemocratic. Of the
current 185 U.N. members, less than half can credibly claim a genuine
democratic pedigree, including full political freedoms for its citizenry. 216
Thus, for the majority of states, the implications of a Western-dominated
Security Council empowered to restore democracy through mandatory col-
lective measures are unpalatable.
If the Security Council's authorization of force against Haiti estab-
lishes that disruptions of democracy constitute threats to international
peace justifying Chapter VII action, even absent an overt military threat,
what of similar recent disruptions of democracy such as those occurring in
212. The fact that the Council's actions regarding Haiti occurred during a period of
expanding Security Council authority in areas traditionally outside its jurisdiction, see
supra notes 15, 117, 131, 166-71, lends credence to this view.
213. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
215. See generally Huntington, supra note 194; Brad Roberts, Democracy and World
Order, 15 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFn. 9 (1991).
216. See supra note 194.
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Sudan (1989),217 Myanmar (1990),218 Suriname (1990),219 Peru
(1992),220 Algeria (1992),221 Sierra Leone (1992),222 Guatemala
(1993),223 Nigeria (1993),224 and Gambia (1994)?225 If the disruption of
democracy in Haiti posed a threat to peace, why doesn't the continuing
denial of democratic rights in China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Zaire, Kenya and
numerous other U.N. member states similarly pose threats to peace which
justify collective action?226 In other words, if the Security Council is
authorized to use mandatory sanctions to restore democracy because its
disruption threatens peace, isn't it equally authorized to use sanctions to
promote democracy where none exists, or to preserve it where it is
threatened?227 That the fair and logically consistent answers to these ques-
tions are politically untenable228 demonstrates the problematic nature of a
Haitian precedent. However, consistent application of such a precedent is
an important element in legitimizing an institution's decision-making. 229
All these sentiments were reflected in the debate over Resolutions 841
and 940.230 For example, to gain necessary support, the text of both reso-
lutions emphasized the "unique" and "exceptional" nature of the Haitian
crisis.2 3 1 Although factual support for asserting this uniqueness is ques-
217. See Alan Cowell, Military Coup In Sudan Ousts Civilian Regime, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1989, at 1.
218. See Paul Lewis, Asians At U.N. Reluctant To Criticize Burmese For Rights Viola-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1990, at 20.
219. See Howard W. French, Suriname, In Army's Ever-Tighter Grip, Skids From Tran-
quility To Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at 3; Suriname Voters Give A Strong Rebuff To
Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27. 1987, at A13.
220. See Tim Golden, Guatemalan, Supported By Army, Disbands Congress And The
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A3.
221. See Democracy Denied In Algeria, N.Y. TIMas, July 24, 1992, at A24 (describing
silence of Western democracies to the Algerian military's cancellation of elections).
222. See President of Sierra Leone Ousted; Troops Rule West African Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1992, at A10.
223. See Golden, supra note 220.
224. See Democracy Struggles In Africa, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 20, 1993, at 20; Nigeria's
Latest Military Leader Bans Political Activity, N.Y. TrMas, Nov. 19, 1993, at A3.
225. One distinguishing factor is that only some of the coups just mentioned
(Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Sudan) resulted in significant refugee flows across interna-
tional borders. See supra notes 166, 175-80 and accompanying text. The use of refugee
flows as a trigger for collective action, however, itself presents similar issues of consis-
tency. See supra note 189.
226. But see supra note 22. Some such authoritarian regimes are even more guilty of
creating refugees, displaced populations, grave human rights abuses and other "interna-
tionalizing factors" than was the Haitian military. Iran, Myanmar, Nigeria, Cuba and
China are among the more obvious examples. See supra note 181.
227. See supra note 22.
228. Actions to create, preserve or restore democracy in large powerful states would
also be difficult, if not impossible, as a practical matter. See infra note 278 and accom-
panying text.
229. See THOMAS H. FRANmc, THE PowER oF LEGrnMAcY AMONG NATIONS 135-53, 180-
93. See also Donoho, supra note 22, at 851-54.
230. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12, at 8 (Brazil), 10 (Nigeria), 19 (Spain),
25 (Oman), 25 (Pakistan); U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17, at 9 (Council Presi-
dent's statement), 12 (Venezuela), 15 (Pakistan), 17 (Brazil), 20 (China).
231. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 11, at 2; S.C. Res. 841, supra note 9, at 2.
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tionable, 23 2 the motivations for doing so are clear: acquiescence to the
sanctions was acceptable only if no precedent for similar future action
would be created. Similarly, several Council members cited requests for
assistance from the OAS and Aristide as justifications for sanctions. 2 33
This rationale tends to undermine the argument that the loss of democracy
itself in Haiti created a threat to peace and raises implications probably
never contemplated by the Security Council.234 These political implica-
tions were reflected in the Council's slow response to the crisis and will
ultimately limit its value as a test case for the U.N.'s resolve to restore or
preserve democracy in the future.
A second factor which will likely inhibit the use of collective measures
to promote, preserve or restore democracy is the fear of Western domina-
tion revealed in the continuing influence of Article 2(7)'s prohibition of
interference in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."2 35 Although, by its terms, Article 2(7) "shall not prejudice" Chapter
VII enforcement measures,236 the concept of non-interference was invoked
repeatedly throughout U.N. debates regarding the crises in Iraq, Haiti,
Somalia and Rwanda, and was the primary rhetorical foil utilized by those
states opposing Security Council action in those countries. 2 37 Similarly,
232. See supra notes 175-81, 217-27 and accompanying text.
233. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413, supra note 12, at 7 (Canada), 14 (Argentina), 23 (Russian
Federation), 25 (Pakistan); U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17, at 12 (Venezuela), 17
(Brazil), 20 (China). Professor Franck has argued that collective action to support
democracy could be justified by such an invitation. See Franck, supra note 1, at 85.
Other authors have suggested that even unilateral action in this context is justified to
support a "legitimate" democratically elected government. See Reisman, supra note 163;
W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORD.
IN'L LJ. 794 (1995). But see Schachter, supra note 163, at 645 (arguing that Reisman
fails to adequately support his thesis).
234. With regard to restoring democracy, for example, the usurper is the de facto
government-in full control of the state and its territory. Besides the potential for abuse,
see infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text, a decision to support a government in
exile with force based solely upon "invited intervention," clearly requires choosing sides.
This presents troubling implications for the right of self-determination when the usurper
has popular support (e.g., the Sandinista ouster of Somosa in Nicaragua). In situations
such as Haiti, in which the replaced government took power with overwhelming popular
support expressed in a free and fair election, this potential is negligible. Another impor-
tant issue is what constitutes the legal justifications for collective action by invitation. If,
for example, the deposed "legitimate" government requests U.N. intervention, is it neces-
sary for the Council to find a threat to peace in order to invoke collective measures?
Unlike consent in peace-keeping, the invitation in this case comes from only one party
to the dispute-the party who is not in control of the subject territory. It is likely that this
factor and other realities would require use of Chapter VII. Moreover, the Security
Council is presumably limited to the authority granted to it by member states through
the Charter. This would indicate that a threat to peace, which is the Charter prerequisite
for mandatory actions, must be met even if the deposed government requests forcible
intervention. See supra notes 113-18, 136-49 and accompanying text. Since the Council
explicitly relied on Chapter VII despite the Aristide government's "invitation," it appears
that the Council agrees.
235. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
236. Id.
237. Regarding Haiti, for example, see UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL. ASSEMBLY; PROVI-
SIONAl. VERBATIM REcoRD OF THE 71sT MEETING, at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.71 (1992)
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the U.N. has generally treated extra-constitutional changes in government
as an exclusively domestic political concern within the confines of Article
2(7). 238 The historical success of this proposition is hardly surprising
given the self-interests of a very undemocratic U.N. membership,239 whose
survival demands a broad interpretation of non-interference.
Like many Charter provisions, the principle of non-interference
embodied in Article 2(7) is an extraordinarily vague, elastic concept with a
long history of manipulation. There is ample evidence to support the cyni-
cal view that the concept of non-interference primarily serves as a conve-
nient excuse for inaction and is, at its worst, a self-serving device for
tyrants to preserve power through oppression. 24° The principle of non-
interference, however, is not solely a device to avoid international scrutiny.
Nor is it simply an atavistic, instinctual expression of nationalism or an
obsolete concept of absolute sovereignty. Rather, for the vast majority of
U.N. member States, the principle of non-interference is an important
counterweight to a Western-dominated new world order. Indeed, the
U.N.'s historical failure to act aggressively to restore disrupted democracy
and its controversial response to the situation in Haiti demonstrate that
less developed countries, non-aligned nations and surviving socialist states
cling tightly to the concept of non-interference. 241 No longer able to
(Comments of Brazilian representative); Id. at 61-63 (Mexico); U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413,
supra note 12, at 6 (Cuba), 6-7 (Uruguay), 9-10 (Brazil), 11 (Nigeria), 19 (Spain); U.N.
Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17, at 20-21; LEt-r o FOM CUBAN REPRESENTrAV, supra note
160; Aristide Tells U.N. Security Council Coup Is Threat To All, RauTrs, Oct. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; David Scheffer, China's Dread Of The New
World Order, WASH. PosT, Oct. 4, 1991, at C7; supra notes 64-66. Regarding Resolution
688 and Iraqi Kurds, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982, supra note 166, at 9-10 (Pakistan), 17
(Iraq), 23 (Romania), 27-30 (Yemen), 31 (Zimbabwe), 44-46 (Cuba), 56 (China). See
also MALANc.zuI, supra note 15, at 19; United Nations: Growing Concerns Over Role of
Security Council, INR PazsS SERVICE, Apr. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Inpres File.
238. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/55, supra note 60, at 30-31; Scheffer, supra note
237; supra notes 189-95, 203-11 and accompanying text. See also Glennon, supra note
160, at 71.
239. See supra note 194.
240. It is an unlikely coincidence that the world's worst abusers of human rights,
such as the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, Myanmar, Iran and Indonesia, are
also the most vociferous champions of the principle of non-interference. See, e.g., Alan
Riding, China Wins Fight On Rights Groups, N.Y. Tnias, June 17, 1993, at A15; A-M.
Rosenthal, Do Gods Get Angry?, N.Y. TnMEs, June 18, 1993, at A27.
241. General Assembly resolutions and debates dearly reflect a fear of domination
(real or imagined) and emphasize the paramount importance of sovereignty and non-
interference. See supra notes 50-54, 197, 203-11, 237-38 and accompanying text. For
example, a recent resolution regarding the U.N.'s involvement in election monitoring
"recogniz[ed]" that no single political system or electoral process is "equally suited to all
nations" and that monitoring "should not call into question each state's sovereign right,
in accordance with the will of its people, freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems whether or not they conform to the preferences of other
States." G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 28. See supra notes 51-54. Similarly, General
Assembly resolutions on self-determination continue to focus on decolonization, exter-
nal threats to sovereignty and non-intervention. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/87, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 155, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); G.A. Res. 46/88, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 157, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991). Even recently
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manipulate the politics of a bipolar world to gain advantage, avoid scrutiny,
or secure protection,242 these member states favor an expansive view of
domestic jurisdiction which preserves sovereign prerogatives. 243 This
world view similarly implies a narrow interpretation of threats to peace,
thereby limiting Security Council action under the Western-dominated new
world order.
Significantly, the U.N. has had relatively little experience with Chapter
VII enforcement actions. 244 Thus, although the "threat to peace" criterion
is almost fifty years old, its contours are still underdeveloped. 245 More-
over, this key Charter requirement is highly elastic, if not entirely indeter-
minate. As a result, the Security Council has a great deal of flexibility to
interpret which factual circumstances pose threats to international
peace.246 Indeed, the Council's interpretation of this critical phrase is in
adopted guidelines for international humanitarian assistance included the seemingly
unnecessary admonition that such efforts must respect the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and "national unity" of the receiving state and "should be provided with the con-
sent" of that state. G.A. Res. 46/182, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/46/49 (1991). Such language may have been in response to the broad interpre-
tation of Resolution 688 by the Gulf War Coalition. See supra note 169. General Assem-
bly annual debates also reflect the importance of non-interference to many states. See,
e.g., The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1993, at 35-49 (summarizing the 1992 gen-
eral debate); The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1992, at 20-33 (summarizing the
1991 general debate).
242. See generally Roberts, supra note 15, at 594, 618-19.
243. This reluctance to concede inroads on state sovereignty and the mixed motives
behind it should not be surprising. Individual states remain the creative centers of inter-
national law and international decision-making. See Martti Koskenneimi, The Future of
Statehood, 32 HAuv. I r'L LJ. 397 (1991). Strident nationalism and non-democratic rule
are still the predominant characteristics of the international order. Thus, most govern-
ments' interests remain, as before, centered on jealous preservation of state sovereignty-
and thereby their own prerogatives, whether legitimate or corrupt.
244. Despite hundreds of armed conflicts since 1945, the Security Council has only
authorized force or broad economic sanctions in about a dozen situations (Korea, the
Congo, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Liberia,
Rwanda and Haiti). See supra notes 146-56. In some of these cases the Security Council
did not expressly cite Chapter VII nor clearly identify the threat to peace. All but four of
these cases (Korea, the Congo, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa) occurred after 1990.
See supra notes 187-88.
245. See generally Gerald McGinley, The 1.CJ. Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA.J.
INT'L L. 577 (1992). In the past, the General Assembly has taken steps to establish
relevant criteria for defining aggression and threats to peace. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/43,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 89, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); G.A. Res.
3314(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 2734(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189 (emphasizing sovereign equal-
ity and non-interference). However, none of these resolutions is binding on the Security
Council. Currently, the Council has final, and perhaps unreviewable, discretion to
determine what constitutes a threat to peace. See infra note 255.
246. See infra note 255. See also Caron, supra note 15, at 560-61; Childers, supra note
20, at 133; McGinley, supra note 245; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis In
the United Nations, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 83, 93-95 (1993); Roberts, supra note 15, at 612-13;
G. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34 HARv. J. INr'L L. 1
(1993).
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practice, if not by design,24 7 much more an expression of political will
than a discourse about the intended meaning of legal terms.248 Many
states, believing the Security Council to be both Western-dominated and
largely unprincipled, are understandably chary about the Council's recent
expansive view of this key Charter term.24 9
The Security Council's recent actions in Haiti appear to give credence
to fears that a Western-dominated Security Council is willing to stretch its
definition of threats to peace to include any situation in which a Western
power's interests are implicated. The Council's mandatory Chapter VII
sanctions against Libya are a prime example. At the behest of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, the Council ordered mandatory
restrictions on international travel and communications with Libya.25 0
The purpose of these sanctions was to force Libya to surrender two of its
citizens to British or American authorities to stand trial for suspected
involvement in terrorist attacks on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scot-
land, in December 1988 and UTA flight 722 in Niger in September 1989.
247. See GOODICH & HAmBRO, supra note 24, at 207, 263-66; Thomas H. Franck, The
"Powers of Appreciation:" Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of U.N. Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 519, 520 (noting that a proposal for the I.CJ. to make a "preliminary determination"
of each U.N. organization's competence to the I.CJ. was rejected during Charter negotia-
tions); Reisman, supra note 246, at 93-95; Smith, supra note 111, at 305; Watson, supra
note 246, at 8-14 (describing the rejection of proposals to give the I.CJ. judicial review
powers). The creation of detailed criteria defining "aggression" was also rejected by the
major powers at Dumbarton Oaks. See HOFFmANN, supra note 15, at 6-7.
248. By its nature, the term "threat to peace" is probably neither suitable for nor
susceptible to precise definition, depending as it does on an infinite variety of factual
circumstances. Therefore, the fact-finding and decision-making processes for identify-
ing threats to peace are critical. See Caron, supra note 15, at 555-62; infra notes 262-66
and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., UNrrED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY; QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTA-
TION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: REPORT OF THE SEC-
-ARY-GEPApL±, at 21-23, U.N. Doc. A/48/264 (1993) [hereinafter QUESTION OF
EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION] (Colombia cites "widespread belief" that the Council has
"illegally expanded its powers" through a "loose, liberal and creative interpretation of...
threats to international peace and security"); id. at 24-25 (Costa Rica), 78 (Paraguay),
21-22, 25, 36, 64, 78 (General Assembly debate); UNrrEo NATIONS, GEaNER ASSEMBLY;
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM REcoRD OF THE 18TH MEMING, at 31-71, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.18
(1992) (General Assembly debate). See also Nancy Arnison, International Law and Non-
Interference: When Do Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETcHER F.
WORLD AFF. 199 (1993); Caron, supra note 15, at 552-53; Philippe Kirsch, The
Expanding Peacemaking Role of the United Nations, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 139, 139-
40 (1992); Recent Developments, Fourth Legal Advisors Meeting, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 379
(1993) (participants urging greater predictability in Council decisions and development
of criteria for triggering Chapter VII); Reisman, supra note 15, at 95; Watson, supra note
246, at 43-44; United Nations: Growing Concerns Over Role Of Security Council, INTER
PRESS SERvcE, Apr. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
250. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 140. This resolution was strongly promoted by the
United States, the United Kingdom and France, while non-aligned nations (Cape Verde,
India, Morocco, and Zimbabwe) and China abstained. See Security Council Imposes Con-
ditional Air, Arms Embargo Against Libya, U.N. CHRON., June 1992, at 19. See also S.C.
Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Res. & Dec. at 113-15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993)
(extending sanctions).
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The connection between Libya's failure to turn over the two suspects
in these seven-year-old bombings and the maintenance of international
peace is not overwhelmingly apparent. Ostensibly, Libya's intransigence
constituted a threat to peace because it lent support to international terror-
ism, which in turn posed a threat to international peace and security.
Although support of international terrorism may clearly threaten interna-
tional stability, it is much less clear why Libya's refusal to allow extradition
of its citizens accused of terrorism to the United States also did so. 2
5 1
The threat to peace posed by the coup in Haiti is similarly indirect,
premised solely on the destabilizing effects that the disruption of democ-
racy and an accompanying refugee flow might have on regional stabil-
ity.25 2 Despite its noble intentions, the Security Council's factual basis for
finding a threat to international peace in Somalia is also subject to ques-
tion.253 These examples of recent, unprecedented Council activity appear
to be based more on expediency than on principled decision-making. 25
4
The Council's actions also reflect a selectivity which may be best explained
by the influence of the United States and a Western agenda.
All these examples, including Haiti, share significant characteristics
which tend to exacerbate fears of an activist, Western-dominated Security
Council. First, a threat to international peace justifying Chapter VII sanc-
tions may involve a crisis which is essentially localized within a state's bor-
ders and need not involve an overt, immediate or clearly tangible use of
military force. Second, recent International Court of Justice decisions sug-
gest that the Security Council may enjoy largely unreviewable discretion to
determine whether events pose the prerequisite threat to peace. 255 Third,
251. See Marc Weller, Crisis for the New World Order, NEw UJ., May 1, 1992, at 592.
In this case, extradition arguably would violate both traditional rules on extradition and
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. Nevertheless,
Libya has offered to allow both men to be tried in some neutral forum. SeeJulia Preston,
U.N. Council Adds Sanctions on Libya, WASH. Post, Nov. 12, 1993, at A39. The United
States, Britain, and France rejected this compromise in favor of continuing sanctions.
Id. See Julia Preston, U.S. Annoyed But May Not Retaliate Over Sanctions Busting Libyan
Flight, WASH. Posr, Apr. 21, 1995, at A30; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Imposing Embargo On
Libyan Oil No Easy Task, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at A9 (U.S. proposing
oil embargo).
252. See supra notes 160-213 and accompanying text.
253. See Glennon, supra note 160, at 72; Gordon, supra note 15 at 572; supra notes
162, 166. The best argument that Somalia presented a threat to peace rests on the
potential effect that disintegration of the Somalia government might have on neighboring
states.
254. The potential for ad hoc decision-making by the Council is, to a degree, built
into the U.N. system. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 15, at 93-95. Nor is it necessarily a
recent phenomenon. For example, the threats to international peace posed in the cases
of South Africa, see supra note 188, and Southern Rhodesia, see supra note 187, were
unclear and were certainly less threatening than numerous other contemporaneous situ-
ations. In light of new-found Security Council unity, decision-making founded primar-
ily on expediency and a Western political agenda is a threatening prospect for the less
powerful states. See supra notes 255-66 and accompanying text.
255. The ICJ's decision on provisional remedies in the Lockerbie case, supra note 147,
has spawned considerable debate among academics regarding the limited potential for
judicial review of Council decisions under Chapter VII. See generally Jose E. Alvarez,
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the Council's decisions reflect a great deal of selectivity and
inconsistency.25 6
Most importantly, these examples seem to demonstrate that the Secur-
ity Council will find a threat to peace justifying mandatory collective action
only where the permanent five members' interests are affected. In numer-
ous other cases of political upheaval, internal conflict and humanitarian
crises apparently indistinguishable from Haiti, the Council has failed to act
decisively, if at all. Some of the more obvious examples include the Coun-
cil's failure to order sanctions against Israel for its defiance of Council reso-
lutions,257 its tepid (or non-existent) response to numerous violent
coups, 25 8 its veto-based inability to even censure the permanent five for
egregious violations of the peace in Panama, Grenada, Afghanistan, Tibet
and elsewhere, and its aggressive protection of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, in
contrast to its inaction with respect to other oppressed minorities around
the world.
This lack of consistency arguably reflects decision-making based upon
the political interests of powerful states rather than upon principled fact-
finding and adherence to standards.259 Although otherwise laudable, the
Council's justifications for acting in Haiti are difficult to distinguish from
other even more egregious denials of democracy and human rights viola-
tions.260 Cynics suspect that the only actual distinction is the desire of the
United States and France to resolve a crisis which implicated their own
national interests. The fact that the Council also appears incapable of
effectively carrying out its orders without U.S. military support heightens
Judging the Security Council, 90 Am. J. Ir'TL L. 1 (1996). Challenging U.S. demands to
extradite its nationals, Libya argued that the Council's actions in support of those
demands were ultra vires because Libya's failure to turn over the suspects did not consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security and was allowable under the 1971 Mon-
treal Convention. Lockerbie, supra note 147, at 125-26, 203-04. The ICJ rejected Libya's
arguments for provisional relief, ruling that the Security Council's Resolution regarding
Libya took precedence over the Montreal Convention and was binding on the ICJ, at
least with regard to the provisional relief requested. Id. at 126-27. One clear implica-
tion of the Court's decision is that the ICJ lacks the power of judicial review. This view
is consistent with the Charter and its travaux prdparatoires. See Certain Expenses of the
United Nations, supra note 43, at 168. See also Watson, supra note 246, at 8-14. Some
commentators, however, have found room in the Court's Lockerbie opinion for potential
judicial review of future Council decisions. See Franck, supra note 247, at 52-23; Reis-
man, supra note 15, at 92-93; Watson, supra note 246, at 22-28. However, given the
circumstances of the Court's decision, prior case law and the Charter's travaux
preparatoires, it is doubtful that the Security Council's future decisions to impose
mandatory sanctions will be subjected to any form of meaningful institutional review.
256. See supra notes 178-81, 189-96, 217-28 and accompanying text.
257. See Childers, supra note 17, at 136; Clyde Haberman, Raid On Iraq... And Some
Of The Israelis See It, Too, N.Y. Tiams, Jan. 15, 1993, atA8; David Hoffman, Arabs' Muted
Reactions Reflect Changing Times; Iraq's Importance Wanes After Gulf War, WAsH. POsr,
Jan. 18, 1993, at A21.
258. See, e.g., supra notes 190-92, 217-25.
259. See generally Caron, supra note 15, at 558-60, 563-72 (discussing the legal and
practical "means" for dominance); Reisman, supra note 15, at 95-96; Roberts, supra note
15, at 616-17.
260. See supra notes 178-81, 217-28.
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this growing atmosphere of suspicion and insecurity. 261 Practical depen-
dence on U.S. political will arguably reduces Security Council authority to
a mere institutional cover for the U.N.'s most powerful member, thereby
giving U.S.-initiated actions the patina of multilateralism.
The third factor which may prove an impediment to U.N. actions to
restore democracy is the widespread perception that Security Council deci-
sion-making lacks institutional legitimacy. 262 With the demise of cold war
politics, many non-western countries are reasserting old misgivings about
the decision-making process of the U.N. and the ability of the major powers
to dominate the Security Council.263 Distrust among third world states
regarding Security Council activism in the new world order is based, at
least in part, on perceived flaws in the U.N.'s institutional structure. For
example, Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia, a spokesperson for the non-
aligned movement, recently declared that the Security Council's unrepre-
sentative nature, lack of transparent decision-making and history of selec-
tivity were significant obstacles to any enhancement of U.N. peace-keeping
or peacemaking operations in the near future. 264 Among other things,
non-aligned states want to expand Security Council membership (includ-
ing increasing the number of permanent representatives), to make deci-
sion-making more open and visible, to eliminate the veto, to improve the
credibility of U.N. fact-finding, and to provide the General Assembly with
greater power, including a true legislative role.2 65
261. Virtually all Council-ordered activities, including peace-keeping, are dependant
on U.S. financial and military support. See Richard Bernstein, Sniping Is Growing At The
U.N. Over Weakness In Peacekeeping, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1993, at A6; Michael R.
Gordon, New Strength For U.N. Peacekeepers: U.S. Might, N.Y. TIMwES, June 13, 1993, at
A16. See also Caron, supra note 15, at 554 n.8; Weston, supra note 147, at 525 (describ-
ing how, in Professor Weston's view, the Gulf War demonstrated "how complete" U.S.
domination over the U.N. "policing mechanisms" has become).
262. During the annual General Assembly debates in 1991 and 1992, for example,
state representatives from all but the Western states emphasized the need for institu-
tional reforms, particularly democratization of U.N. decision-making. Many of these
states also expressed their opposition to Western hegemony. See The Nations Speak,
U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1993, at 35-49; The Nations Speak, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1992, at 20-33.
Calls for Security Council reform have continued and strengthened through 1995. See,
e.g., QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENrATION, supra note 249 (nearly all of the 50 states
responding call for extensive reform). See also The Nations Speak: Meeting The Chal-
lenges Of The 21st Century, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at 40-75 (1994 General Assembly
opening session debate summaries). Calls for reform have also appeared in the work of
the General Assembly's main committees. See, e.g., M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas
& Virginia Morris, The Work of the Sixth Committee at the 47th Session, 87 Am. J. INT'L L.
306 (1993); M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vraflas, The Work of the Sixth Committee at the
48th Session, 88 Am. J. IN'L L. 343 (1994); Recent Developments, Fourth Legal Advisors
Meeting, supra note 249, at 379.
263. See supra note 262.
264. See Jennifer Metzger, Beyond Peacekeeping: The Work of the 47th General Assem-
bly, THE INTERDEPENDENT, Spring 1993, at 7.
265. See supra notes 249-62. This recent reform movement and accompanying argu-
ments about the credibility and fairness of U.N. decision-making has generated substan-
tial recent literature by Western commentators regarding the Council's institutional
legitimacy and democracy within the U.N. system. See, e.g., HoFmFMA, supra note 15, at
3747; Caron, supra note 15, at 555-62, 565, 572; Richard L. Gaines, On the Road to a
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The motivations for these proposed institutional reforms may, of
course, be self-serving. Some states, for example, may desire to reform
U.N. decision-making precisely in order to forestall U.N. actions aimed at
promoting democracy, rather than to increase the institution's legitimacy.
Nevertheless, reforms which improve the perceived fairness, consistency
and credibility of the decision-making process are essential to gain wide-
spread support for any mandatory actions to restore democracy. In the
absence of institutional safeguards to protect non-Western interests, the
U.N. majority will undoubtedly continue to resist expansive use of Chapter
VII, even at the cost of goals such as representative democracy and human
rights.2 66
A final factor which will, at least in the short term, work to inhibit the
Haitian precedent could be termed institutional fatigue and impracticabil-
ity. The U.N. currently deploys about 70,000 personnel in sixteen peace-
keeping operations around the world, at a cost of approximately four bil-
lion dollars per year.2 67 During a 1993 meeting of the Security Council,
the Secretary-General briefed Council members on twenty-two "trouble
spots" requiring attention and reportedly had trouble distinguishing
among the numerous operative Security Council resolutions.2 68 A high-
ranking U.N. official noted that Jane's Defense listed seventy-five on-going
crises around the world in 1993.269 More significantly, the U.N. continues
to experience mixed success in its peace-keeping and humanitarian opera-
tions as the demands on such operations grow. 270 Among the many
Pax U.N: Using the Peace Tools at Our Disposal, 25 N.Y.U.J. IN'L L. & POL'Y 543, 570-74
(1993); Gassama, supra note 1, at 329-30; Gordon, supra note 15, at 581; Dianne Otto,
Challenging the "New World Order": International Law, Global Democracy and the Pos-
sibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoiNTM. PROBS. 371 (1993); Roberts, supra note
15, at 621-25. For an earlier version of this debate, see Thomas H. Franck, United
Nations Based Prospects ForA New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U.J. ITr'L L. & PoI- 601 (1990).
See also FEnmEcz, supra note 113, at 484-85 (describing earlier proposals for reform
before the General Assembly's Special Committee on Strengthening the Organization).
266. See supra notes 237, 241, 249 and accompanying text. The Council is not, of
course, expressly empowered under the Charter to seek such goals, except to the extent
that they may implicate international peace and security. See supra notes 113-18, 136,
149 and accompanying text. The definitional flexibility of the Charter's threat to peace
requirement, however, leaves significant room for such action, as witnessed by the Coun-
cil's recent interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. See supra notes 117, 131, 166,
171, 178.
267. See U.N. Peacekeeping Around the World, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 4041, 45;
Richard Bernstein, Sniping Is Growing At The U.N. Over Weakness In Peacekeeping, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1993, at A6; Paul Lewis, U.N. Is In Arrears On Peace Efforts, N.Y. TRAs,
May 16, 1993, at 9; Trevor Rowe, Is the U.N. Failing?, THE INTERDEPENDEmN, Spring 1993,
at 1, 6; Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Chief Says Finances Hurt Its Role, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1995, at AS.
268. Bernstein, supra note 267, at A6; Julia Preston, U.N. Is Faced With A Crisis Of
Credibility; Enforcement Capability, Peace-Keeping Role At Issue, WASH. Posr, Feb. 1,
1993, at A12; Rowe, supra note 267, at 1, 6.
269. Rowe, supra note 267.
270. Operations in Cambodia, Angola, Western Sahara, Somalia and the Balkans have
all encountered significant setbacks and mixed results under difficult conditions. See A
'Major Tragic Setback': UNAVEM II Mandate Extended, supra note 4; Bernstein, supra
note 267; Cambodia: Deep Concern Expressed Over Implementation Of Paris Agreements
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problems facing U.N. efforts is a significant shortfall in financial
resources. 271 The current financial and institutional strain on the U.N. is
enormous and appears at times to have virtually overwhelmed its organiza-
tional capacity.2 72
Serious questions also remain about the efficacy of any U.N. action to
restore democracy in Haiti and elsewhere without extensive involvement in
the political and economic structure of the country.273 Simply holding
elections and returning President Aristide to office, for example, may be
insufficient to create a viable democracy in Haiti absent a political culture
and institutions which safeguard it.274 Thus, if the U.N.'s goal is to nur-
ture a long-term, genuine democracy and to affirm the emerging right to
democratic governance in a meaningful way, then building an infrastruc-
ture which protects democracy will be necessary. At minimum, the crea-
tion of safeguards for an independent judiciary, reorganization and
professionalization of the police and military forces and general economic
revitalization are necessary.275
Increasingly, U.N. bureaucrats have leveled legitimate complaints that
member states have dumped complex, problematic situations onto the
organization without providing the resources or support necessary to
In Cambodia, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 31-33; Preston, supra note 268; Rowe, supra
note 267; Western Sahara: Morocco and Polisario Urged To Ensure Success Of Settlement
Plan, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1992, at 17; Yugoslavia Crisis: The Tragedy Continues With 'No
Sign Of Abatement,' U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 10-19.
271. See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Juggles Funds To Stay Afloat, Expert Says, N.Y. TiMEs,
Sept. 13, 1995, at A8; Wren, supra note 267. See also News Almanac: UN Financial Situa-
tion "Precarious", U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1992, at 79; Bernstein, supra note 267. The pri-
mary peace-keeping donors were $1.7 billion in arrears in August 1995. Wren, supra
note 267. The organization's unpaid peace-keeping and regular budget assessments
totaled $3.7 billion in September 1995. Id. "Almost two thirds" of the debt outstanding
in 1993 was owed by Security Council members. Action in U.N. Restructuring Postponed,
U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 77. By August 1994, the U.N.'s general debt exceeded $1.7
billion. News Almanac: Financial Crisis A Political Question, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1995, at
95.
272. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 267; Bernstein, supra note 267.
273. See 1994 REPORT ON ELEcrlONS, supra note 26, at 12-13; TExiER REPORT, supra
note 71; Howard French, Restoring Stability To Haiti Is Seen As The Next Big Test, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 5, 1993, at 4; Larry Rohter, The World; Haiti Is A Land Without A Country,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1994, at 3.
274. Flawed elections held after Aristide's return are perhaps evidence of this prob-
lem. See Steven Greenhouse, Election Monitor Criticizes Haitian Vote For Widespread
Fraud, N.Y. TiMs,July 21, 1995, at AS. The Commission on Human Rights independent
expert Philippe Texier concluded in his 1990 report on human rights in Haiti that seri-
ous obstacles to genuine democracy still existed there. Among other factors, he cited
serious human rights abuses, political assassinations, an ineffectual judicial system,
blurred distinctions between military and police forces, paramilitary activities and mili-
tarized rural areas. TaxiER REPORT, supra note 71, at 30-31. The shocking violence
which precipitated the resumption of sanctions against Haiti in October 1993 poign-
antly emphasized the point that elections are only a small part of creating a genuine
democracy. See Steven A. Holmes, Bid To Restore Haiti's Leader Is Derailed, N.Y. TiMEs,
Oct. 13, 1993, at Al; Paul Lewis, U.N. Again Imposes Sanctions On Haiti After Pact Fails,
N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al.
275. See generally TxmR REPORT, supra note 71; HuNTINGTON, supra note 194, at 208-
79; Schnably, supra note 70.
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resolve them.2 76 The resulting strain has caused some states and U.N. offi-
cials to become increasingly reluctant to intervene in internal political or
ethnic conflicts which are not likely seriously to threaten international
peace. 277 The complexity and expense of restoring democracy (as well as
the number of potential candidates) are likely to similarly inhibit collective
measures against future disruptions of democracy.
The sobering effect of this sentiment can be illustrated by comparing
the U.N. response in Haiti with larger, more popular candidates for U.N.
actions to restore democracy. Haiti is a very small island country with a
tiny and ineffectual military. Nevertheless, it took nearly three years, severe
and costly economic sanctions and almost 20,000 U.S. soldiers to secure
the country for President Aristide's return. 2 78 Committing the U.N. to
such an undertaking in larger, more powerful countries such as Nigeria,
Algeria and Myanmar would be a daunting proposition for a U.N. already
greatly overextended due to world circumstances.
Conclusion
The Security Council's actions in Haiti, taken at face value, reflect a timely
evolution in the U.N.'s commitment to democracy. Most significantly, the
Council's actions seem to indicate that the disruption of democratic rights,
at least when coupled with refugee flows, may constitute a threat to inter-
national peace even in the absence of overt military conflict. There are
significant reasons, however, to doubt the depth of this new commitment to
democratic rule. First, the factual predicates for the Council's finding a
threat to peace were tenuous and at odds with its failure to act in similar or
worse situations elsewhere. Such inconsistent decision-making raises cyni-
cal concerns that future efforts to restore democracy will be limited to
small island states which cast off refugees toward U.S. shores. Although its
actions in Haiti suggest that the disruption of democracy can be an appro-
priate justification for Chapter VII enforcement actions, the Security Coun-
cil will probably resume its tepid response to disruptions of democracy
except in those cases where a major Western power's interests are
implicated.
Second, the U.N. majority is likely to resist any future Chapter VII
sanctions to restore democratic rule elsewhere. This resistance is based
upon both the self-serving desire of states to preserve their sovereign pre-
rogatives and the legitimate distrust of a new world order dominated by the
276. See Bernstein, supra note 267; Rowe, supra note 267. See also Ruth Marcus, Clin-
ton Seeks Limits On Peace Keeping; U.N. "Must Learn When To Say No", WASH. PosT, Sept.
28, 1993, at Al (President Clinton urging limits on new peace-keeping).
277. See supra note 276.
278. See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text. The U.N. could, of course,
choose to employ less intrusive means of restoring democracy, such as limited economic
sanctions or consensual deployment of peace-keepers. However, the experience of Haiti
itself demonstrates the ineffectiveness of such measures in actually restoring democracy.
See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, such actions may have
important deterrence value as well as promoting symbolic and normative goals.
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United States and its allies. Institutional issues regarding Security Council
decision-making will likely work to limit the precedential impact of Haiti.
Adverse to international scrutiny and opposed to Western hegemony, the
U.N. majority will undoubtedly resist intervention in future coups, sug-
gesting that Haiti was, as described by the Council President, a "unique
and exceptional situation [which] should not be regarded as constituting a
precedent."279 These factors suggest that significant institutional changes
at the U.N., particularly in its decision-making processes, will be necessary
before the international community can be persuaded to take meaningful
steps to promote, protect and preserve emerging rights to democratic
government.
279. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238, supra note 17 (Council President stating that members of
the Council had asked him to say so).
